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RADICAL TAX REFORM, MUNICIPAL FINANCE, AND 

THE CONSERVATIVE AGENDA 
Eric J. Gouvin* 
Proponents of a consumption tax system to replace the federal 
income tax typically couch their support for radical tax reform in 
the language of traditional tax policy goals. They claim that 
their reform plans promote the goals of simplicity, economic 
efficiency, stability, and equity. This Article examines how well 
the proposed tax reforms will achieve those goals in the context 
of their anticipated impact on state and local finance. The effects 
on state and local governments of a flattened-rate income tax, 
flat tax, or a broad federal consumption tax could be enormous 
and devastating. The Article finds that all of the reform 
proposals fall far short of achieving the traditional goals of tax 
policy in the context ofstate and local finance. 
This Article develops an alternative explanation for why the 
radical tax proposals are currently under serious consideration. 
It suggests that the adverse impact that the federal-level reforms 
will have on state and local finance is not an incidental side 
effect, but rather is part of a strategy consistent with 
conservative thinking to reduce the size of government and to 
make taxation more difficult. The alternative explanation views 
the tax proposals as a way to advance the conservative political 
agenda on at least two fronts: (1) to remove tax expenditures as a 
policy tool and thereby reduce the opportunities for "social 
engineering" by the central government; and (2) to force a 
realignment of federalism issues in the taxation area by making 
the total tax burden more transparent and making local 
taxation more difficult. 
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1. INTRODUCTION AND PLAN OF PAPER 
For approximately the past ten years, radical reform of the 
federal tax system has been a perennial policy topic in Washington. l 
Some of the proposals under discussion call for a "flattened tax" 
based on our current income tax system;2 some look to implement a 
"flat tax" that would tax business cash flow and individual wages at a 
proportional, rather than a progressive rate;3 still others would seek 
to replace the entire system with a sales tax or value added tax.4 
Many of these same ideas were given serious consideration in the 
early 1980s, and the result was the "flattened" income tax structure 
contained in the 1986 Tax Act.5 Until recently, however, a wholesale 
1. Politicians from across the political spectrum have been vigorously proposing 
major overhauls to the federal income tax system. In an Issue Brief dated February 21, 
2003, the Congressional Research Service identified eleven different tax reform 
proposals ranging from Rep. Gephardt's "flatter" tax proposal, through the more 
orthodox "flat tax" proposals of Representatives Armey & Shelby and Senator Specter, 
and on to the more radical ideas of a National Sales Tax and Value Added Tax. See 
JAMES M. BICKLEY, FLAT TAX PROPOSALS AND FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM: AN 
OVERVIEW, 5-11 (Congo Research Serv., Rep. No. IB95060, 2003) [hereinafter CRS 
OVERVIEW], available at http://www.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreportsl03apr/ib95060.pdf. 
In addition to the airing it has received on Capitol Hill, this complex subject has 
received an astounding amount of attention in the popular press as well. The public 
fascination with the idea of a flat tax may have been the product of media attention 
and not the other way around, but, in any event, the popular press has covered the 
issue with enthusiasm since at least the 1996 presidential race. See Nancy Gibbs, 
Knock 'Em Flat, TIME, Jan. 29, 1996, at 23 (discussing the campaign of Steve Forbes 
and his pet project, the flat tax). Candidate John McCain promoted the idea of a flat 
tax in his presidential campaign in 2000. James K. Glassman, Who's the Flat-Tax 
Candidate? John McCain, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 2000, at A26. At the other extreme, 
even noted tax scholars see the U.S. tax system as being ripe for change. Michael J. 
Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax System, 112 
YALE L.J. 261,261-62 (2002). 
2. See discussion infra Part LA. I. 
3. See discussion infra Part LA.2. While recent proponents have characterized the 
flat tax as a new proposal, it is an idea that has been around since before the modern 
income tax was established in 1913. See Steven A. Bank, Origins of a Flat Tax, 73 
DENY. U. L. REV. 329 (1996) (providing an excellent history of the income tax in the 
United States with special attention to recurring debates over progressivity and 
proportionality). Economist Milton Friedman has been advocating a proportional tax 
for almost 40 years. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 174-76 (1962) 
(advocating a flat rate income tax after a large personal deduction, together with the 
elimination of the corporate income tax, as a way to eliminate tax-related distortions 
in the economy and reduce tax evasion and tax avoidance). 
4. See discussion infra Part LA.4. 
5. See Slade Gorton, Tax Reform and the Tax Legislative Process, in OPTIONS FOR 
TAX REFORM 33, 37 (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1984) (noting the popularity of the flat 
tax idea in the early 1980s and characterizing the Bradley-Gephardt tax proposal, 
which eventually became the 1986 Tax Act, as a "modification of the flat tax 
proposal."). 
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shift in federal tax policy from progressive income taxation to some 
other, more proportional, approach has not enjoyed serious political 
backing.6 
A major thread in the current debate is a move away from 
"income" taxation and toward consumption taxation.7 The idea 
behind the move is that current income taxation policy creates 
disincentives for savings and investment, so a shift toward a system 
where those activities are essentially free from tax might improve the 
national savings rate.s Like proportional taxation, consumption taxes 
have been considered in the past, but have never received serious 
consideration.9 
This round of tax proposals appears to be only the latest episode 
in a long line of tax revolts that have punctuated American history. 10 
If the proponents of tax reform see the income tax itself as the 
enemy, however, they may be in for quite a fight. In the ninety years 
since its enactment, the income tax has taken on a life of its own and 
grown to become the most important source of federal revenue.l1 Over 
the years, Congress has riddled the tax code with myriad deductions, 
credits, exemptions, and exclusions designed to bring about socially 
desirable activities, to appease interest groups who thought the 
system to be unfair, or to consummate political deals. Consequently, 
at this point just about every politically organized group has a vested 
6. Progressivity has been built into the federal income tax since the very 
beginning and was intended at the time of enactment to promote an overall tax burden 
that was roughly proportional, given that the dominant form of federal revenue raising 
at the time, tariffs, was widely perceived to be regressive. See Bank, supra note 3, at 
377 (noting the idea of making the overall tax burden proportional, and in the article 
as a whole, documenting the political support, or lack thereof, for proportional taxation 
over the years). 
7. For an excellent article placing consumption taxing into the broader context of 
taxation theory, see generally Robin Cooper Feldman, Consumption Taxes and the 
Theory ofGeneral and Individual Taxation, 21 VA. TAX REV. 293 (2002). 
8. See John S. Nolan, Erwin N. Griswold Lecture: The Merit of an Income Tax 
Versus a Consumption Tax, 12 AM. J. TAX POL'y 207, 212-13 (1995) (noting the 
theoretical argument in favor of consumption taxes as a way to foster increased 
savings). 
9. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rise of Rhetoric in Tax Reform Debate: An 
Example, 70 TuL. L. REV. 2345, 2360 n.27 (1996) (noting the fact that despite two false 
starts, federal level consumption taxes have not been given serious consideration). 
10. For an entertaining review of tax opposition over the years, see CHARLES 
ADAMS, THOSE DIRTY ROTIEN TAXES: THE TAX REVOLTS THAT BUILT AMERICA (1998) 
(providing an episodic history of tax revolts in the United States from colonial times 
through the 1990s). For a more scholarly treatment of the issue, see Majorie E. 
Kornhauser, Legitimacy and the Right of Revolution: The Role of Tax Protests and 
Anti-Tax Rhetoric in America, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 819 (2002). 
11. For an accessible history of the income tax, see STEVEN R. WEISMAN, THE 
GREAT TAX WARB (2002). 
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interest in the status quo, making wholesale reform of the federal 
taxation scheme extremely difficult from a political perspective.12 
On the other hand, people will always hate to pay taxes, 
especially high taxes. History has borne this out in the context of the 
income tax. Congress reduced the tax base during the 1950s, 1960s, 
and 1970s by granting exemptions, deductions, and credits to 
implement various social policies and political compromises. Yet even 
as the tax base dwindled, the federal budget continued to rely heavily 
on the revenue stream from the income tax. Congress raised 
marginal tax rates in order to secure the needed government 
revenue. 13 AB tax rates increased and loopholes proliferated, a whole 
industry of tax lawyers, tax accountants, and tax shelter promoters 
evolved with the sole purpose of reducing or deferring tax liability.14 
AB the tax avoidance industry grew, more and more people came to 
have a stake in maintaining the status quo of the tax code. At the 
same time, however, enough people became concerned by high 
marginal rates, among other matters, to force a re-reexamination of 
the income tax in the late 1970s and early 1980s. At that time, 
commentators and policymakers began to talk seriously about a flat 
tax15 and consumption taxes.16 
When the flat tax movement came to life in the early 1980s, it 
was in no small part a reaction to the tax shelter industry and the 
combination of tax preferences and high marginal tax rates that 
12. See Milton Friedman, Why a Flat Tax is Not Politically Feasible, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 30, 1995, at A14 (opining that a flat tax will never be enacted because of 
opposition from organized special interest groups and because Congress profits by 
selling tax breaks to political supporters). 
13. Simple algebra informs us that in order to get the needed revenue, X, where X 
is the product of tax base (B) times the tax rate (R) if B is made smaller, R must be 
made larger in order to produce the same outcome, X. 
14. See, e.g., David M. Einhorn, Unintended Advantage: Equity Reits vs. Taxable 
Real Estate Companies, 51 TAX LAw. 203, 217 (1998) ("Another result of the tax 
incentives, a result that was not desired and probably not anticipated was the 
development of a very substantial tax shelter industry."). 
15. In 1981, Robert Hall and Alvin Rabushka co-authored an op-ed piece for the 
Wall Street Journal advocating flat taxes, and that piece ultimately culminated in 
their book, The Flat Tax, in 1985. ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX 
47 (2d ed. 1995). 
16. See RICHARD GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 11-36 (rev. ed. 1976) 
(questioning the validity of income as a measure of tax responsibility and arguing for 
the use of alternative bases such as consumption or wealth); Gordon D. Henderson, 
Alternatives to the Income Tax, in OPTIONS FOR TAX REFORM, supra note 5, at 78 
(discussing flat taxes, consumption taxes and other alternatives); Henry J. Aaron & 
Harvey Galper, A Tax on Consumption, Gifts and Bequests, and Other Strategies for 
Reform, in OPTIONS FOR TAX REFORM, supra note 5, at 106 (discussing various income 
tax alternatives); William D Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal 
Income Tax, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1113 (1974) (making the argument that a consumption 
tax would be fairer than the income tax). 
413 2004] RADICAL TAX REFORM 
made tax shelters work. I7 Proponents of the flat tax wanted to stop 
what they perceived to be unfair tax breaks and economically 
inefficient business deals that were driven more by tax 
considerations than by economics.Is The 1986 attack on tax shelters 
was multi-pronged,I9 but its two key elements were right out of the 
flat tax play book: (1) broaden the tax base by eliminating or 
reducing the tax incentives that attracted tax shelter investments; 
and (2) lower marginal tax rates to reduce the value of tax losses.2o 
The flatter tax that was enacted in 1986 did indeed make the 
bogeyman of tax shelters disappear.21 
Yet even after the broad changes brought about by the 1986 tax 
law, people remained dissatisfied with the tax system. Politicians 
have exploited that public discontent by pushing their various radical 
reform proposals designed to completely replace the existing income 
tax scheme.22 Because the truly abusive tax avoidance problems of 
the pre-1986 era have been put to rest, today's proponents of flat rate 
17. See, e.g., ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX 32-39 (1st ed. 
1985) (citing, as reasons for adopting the flat tax proposal, the inequity in tax shelters 
and in the treatment of capital gains as well as the complexity of the pre-1986 tax 
code). 
18. Id. at 24, 32-36. 
19. See JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 130-31 (5th ed. 1987) 
(describing the 1986 anti-tax shelter provisions). 
20. See id. 
21. See Mona L. Hymel, Tax Policy and the Passive Loss Rules: Is Anybody 
Listening?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 615, 617-27 (1998) (giving a concise history of abusive tax 
shelters and the legislative response thereto, and concluding that the tax shelter 
industry of the 1970s and 1980s is dead). Congress frequently enacts changes to the 
tax laws that target specific tax planning strategies, including, but not limited to, tax 
shelters. Whether those changes to the law are necessary to curtail abuses or merely 
add complexity to the tax code without enhancing fairness or efficiency depends on the 
overall context in which the law and the transactions exist, including the transaction 
costs or other frictions the taxpayer will encounter in trying to avoid the rule. See 
David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1312 
(2001) (discussing "frictions," which are tax planning constraints outside of the tax 
law, and their effects on the taxpayers). 
22. See David Wessel & Greg Hitt, Anti-IRS Frenzy Gives Republicans a Chance to 
Road-Test Plans, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 1997, at Al (describing the calculated political 
gambit of unleashing a full frontal attack on the Internal Revenue Service as a way to 
build support for repeal of the income tax code and its replacement with either a flat 
tax or a sales tax). People are susceptible to manipulation in their thinking about tax 
policy through the employment of framing devices. See generally Edward J. McCaffery 
& Jonathan Baron, Framing and Taxation: Evaluation of Tax Policies Involving 
Household Composition (June 10, 2003), USC Law School, Olin Research Paper No. 
00-18, at http://ssrn.com/abstract=246408. People are also susceptible through their 
inability to aggregate the effects of parallel tax systems. See generally Edward J. 
McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The Humpty Dumpty Blues: Disaggregation Bias in the 
Evaluation of Tax Systems (Jan. 28, 2002), USC Law School, USC CLEO Research 
Paper No. C02-I, at http://ssrn.com/abstract=298648. 
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taxes must offer a new rallying cry if they have any hope of 
implementing the new taxation schemes they champion.23 They claim 
that their reform plans promote the traditional tax policy goals of 
simplicity, economic efficiency, stability, and equity.24 This Article 
examines how well the proposed tax reforms will achieve those goals 
in the context of their anticipated impact on state and local finance. 
The effects on state and local governments of a flattened-rate income 
tax, flat tax, or a broad federal consumption tax could be enormous 
and devastating. This Article finds that the reform proposals all fall 
far short of achieving their purported goals in the context of state 
and local finance. 
In light of the political philosophy of the radical tax reformers, 
the adverse impact on state and local finance may not be an 
incidental side effect of federal tax reform. Instead, the disruptive 
effects the proposed federal changes will have on municipal finance 
may be part and parcel of a strategy to reduce the size of government 
by making the total tax burden more visible and making local 
taxation more difficult. This Article develops an explanation for why 
the radical tax reform proposals are currently under serious 
consideration. The explanation views the tax proposals as a way to 
23. Indeed, while many proponents of tax reform would like a wholesale revision of 
the current scheme, John D. McKinnon, Treasury Weighs Huge Changes in U.S. Tax 
Code, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2002, at A2, it may be that the radical reformers have 
recognized the reality that public dissatisfaction with the current scheme is not 
sufficiently fervent to allow immediate implementation of any radical new taxation 
program, Bruce Bartlett, Tax Torture Is Flat Wrong, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15,2002, at A16 
("[MJost flat-tax supporters have moved away from scrapping the code completely and 
adopted a gradualist approach."). Indeed, while President Bush has indicated support 
for a consumption tax of some kind, Greg Ip, Bush Floats Shift to Consumption Tax, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2003, at A3; he appears to be proposing an incrementalist 
strategy to achieve his tax goals, Howard Gleckman, Inching Toward Tax Reform: 
President Bush Wants Big Tax Changes-But in Small Increments, BUS. WK., Dec. 16, 
2002, at 32. 
24. Although the exact formulation of the attributes of a good tax system vary, 
commentators almost always include "equity," "efficiency," and "simplicity," together 
with some other attribute or two, which often serves as a catch-all for other desirable 
aspects of a tax system. I have decided to call my catch-all category "stability." But see 
J. Kenneth Blackwell, Keynote Address, Seton Hall Legislative Bureau-Flat Tax 
Symposium, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 273, 276-77 (1996) (reflecting the views of the 
author, a member of the Kemp Commission on Economic Growth and Tax Policy, 
identifying six requirements for any tax reform proposal: simplicity, fairness, 
neutrality (what rve called efficiency), visibility (discussed later), stability, and 
freedom for growth (included in my listing of efficiency)); see also STAFF OF THE JOINT 
COMM. ON TAXATION, 104TH CONG., DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF PROPOSALS TO 
REPLACE THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 58 (Comm. Print 1995) (noting that the criteria for 
judging a tax system are economic efficiency, fairness (including both horizontal 
fairness and the ability to pay taxes), simplicity, and the ease of administration, 
enforceability, evasion (this could be thought of as being included in stability)). 
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advance the conservative political agenda on at least two fronts: (1) 
to remove the policy tool of tax expenditures from the Congress and 
thereby reduce the opportunities for "social engineering" by the 
central government; and (2) to force a realignment of federalism 
issues in the taxation area by making the total tax burden more 
transparent and making local taxation more difficult. 
This Article begins with a quick overview of the major types of 
tax reform proposals currently under consideration in Congress. It 
then turns to a discussion of how these proposals would affect 
various aspects of state and local finance. The third section discusses 
the proposals and their effects in light of the traditional policy goals 
of equity, efficiency, simplicity and stability and finds that with 
regard to the impact on state and local finance, the reform proposals 
do not achieve any of the purported policy goals. The last section 
discusses conservative political principles and describes how a 
radical tax reform would advance those ideals even if it does not 
advance the traditional goals of good tax policy. 
A. Overview ofCurrent Proposals 
This Article will not duplicate the efforts of the many books and 
articles examining and comparing the major tax reform proposals.25 
Nevertheless, while in-depth analysis of individual proposals is 
beyond the scope of this Article, it may be useful for our purposes to 
identify the four major categories into which the major proposals fall: 
25. See generally, e.g., STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., 
STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR SIMPLIFICATION app. D, at D-4 to D-16 (2001) (describing recommendations for 
simplification, pursuant to section 8022(3)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986); 
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 104TH CONG., DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF 
PROPOSALS TO REPLACE THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 17-50 (Comm. Print 1995) 
(describing proposals before Congress, including the value-added tax, the Armey "Flat 
Tax," the Nunn-Domenici USA Tax and a national retail sales tax) [hereinafter JOINT 
COMM. ANALYSIS]; GREGG A. ESENWEIN ET AL., THE FLAT TAX AND OTHER REFORM 
PROPOSALS: OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUES (Cong. Research Serv., Rep. No. 96-315E, 1998); 
FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM (Michael J. Boskin ed., 1996) (describing the leading 
proposals and offering analysis by academic commentators); CRS OVERVIEW, supra 
note 1; Alice G. Abreu, Untangling Tax Reform: Simple Taxes, Complex Choices, 33 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1355 (1996) (comparing tax proposals); John K. McNulty, Flat Tax, 
Consumption Tax, Consumption-Type Income Tax Proposals in the United States: A 
Tax Policy Discussion ofFundamental Tax Reform, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2095 (2000); Alan 
Schenk, The Plethora of Consumption Tax Proposals: Putting the Value Added Tax, 
Flat Tax, Retail Sales Tax, and USA Tax into Perspective, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1281 
(1996) (giving an overview of competing tax reform proposals). 
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1. The Flattened Income Tax 
The first, and least radical, tax reform plan is the one proposed 
in the 105th Congress by Representative Dick Gephardes to continue 
the base broadening and rate flattening process he championed in 
the years leading up to the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.27 
Although this plan would continue to employ income as the tax base, 
it would bring radical changes to the income tax as currently 
configured. Under this plan, all itemized or individual deductions (as 
opposed to the "above-the-line" deductions), except the home 
mortgage interest deduction, would be eliminated to make the 
income tax base quite broad.28 Marginal rates would be lowered to a 
range of twenty- through thirty-four percent, with three quarters of 
the population paying an effective rate often percent.29 
2. HalllRabushka-Inspired Flat Taxes 
The second group of proposals are those inspired by the "flat tax" 
proposal developed in the 1980s by Hoover Institution scholars 
Robert E. Hall and Alvin Rabushka.30 The flat tax proposals from 
Representative Richard Armer! together with Senator Richard 
Shelbr2 and the version from Senator Arlen Specter3 seem to fit the 
HalllRabushka model. Some of the ideas advanced by 1996 
presidential hopefuls Steve Forbes and Pat Buchanan probably 
belong in this category as well. 34 
These plans vary but they share the attribute of moving away 
from income taxation and toward consumption taxation.35 The plans 
26. H.R. 3620, 105th Congo (1998). This particular version of tax reform does not 
appear to be under consideration in the 108th Congress. 
27. See Richard A. Gephardt, The Bradley-Gephardt Fair Tax, in OnIONS FOR TAX 
REFORM, supra note 5, at 74 (describing Representative Gephardt's push for a broader 
based, lower rate income tax in the early 1980s). 
28. H.R. 3620 § 202. 
29. See CRS OVERVIEW, supra note 1, at 8-9; RICHARD GEPHARDT, AN EVEN 
BETTER PLACE 171-72 (1999). 
30. See HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 15, at 52-103 (describing their tax plan). 
31. H.R. 1040, 107th Congo (2001). 
32. S. 1040, 107th Congo (2001). 
33. S. 907, 108th Congo (2003). 
34. For an explanation of the proposed tax plans of Steve Forbes and Pat 
Buchanan in 1996, see Dan Goodgame, Is This Tax Flat Unfair? Tax Reform Is a Good 
Idea, but Forbes' Plan Will Make Newt's Cutbacks Look Insipid, TIME, Jan. 29, 1996, at 
30-31. 
35. A noted tax scholar has opined that the HalllRabushka model suffers from 
major design flaws that will make it impracticable as an effective revenue raising 
mechanism. See generally David A. Weisbach, Ironing Out the Flat Tax, 52 STAN. L. 
REV. 599 (2000) (noting, among other things, that the HalllRabushka tax is easy to 
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would repeal the current individual and corporate income taxes, 
along with the estate and gift tax and replace them with a wage tax 
and a cash-flow tax on business. The wage tax would only pick up 
wages, salary, and other compensation; it would not cover dividends, 
interest, capital gains, or other returns to investment.3s The plans 
would eliminate all individual deductions in their current form but 
could provide for progressivity through a series of family exemption 
allowances. The business activities tax would exempt investment 
income from tax but would otherwise tax all receipts less the costs of 
purchases from other businesses, wages, and pension contributions. 
The tax rate for both components would be around twenty percent.37 
3. The Unlimited Savings Allowance (USA) Tax 
The third category is the unlimited savings allowance (USA) tax 
which was originally introduced in the 104th Congress by Senators 
Sam Nunn, Pete Domenici, and J. Robert Kerrey,38 and was 
championed in subsequent Congresses by Representative English.39 
The USA tax is also a consumption tax, but it works a bit differently 
than that the HalllRabushka plan. It taxes businesses on gross 
profits-actual receipts less actual disbursements.4o It does not, 
however, permit the business taxpayer to deduct employee 
compensation and fringe benefits in calculating the taxable amount, 
although it does provide a credit for payroll taxes.41 At the individual 
level, the USA tax taxes wages, salaries, commissions, life insurance 
proceeds, reductions in savings, fringe benefits, capital gains, 
interest, and dividends. It retains some of the popular deductions 
and exclusions from income, including the deduction for home 
mortgage interest and the exclusion of interest on state and local 
bonds.42 It also allows individual taxpayers to reduce their taxable 
avoid, which will lead to inefficiency, complexity, higher rates, and a shift in the 
distribution ofthe tax burden). 
36. See Abreu, supra note 25, at 1361-62 (discussing the decision to specify a 
narrow tax base). 
37. All tax rate estimates should be taken with a grain of salt. See generally 
Lawrence Zelenak, The Selling of the Flat Tax: The Dubious Link Between Rate and 
Base, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 197 (1999). 
3S. S. 722, 104th Congo (1995). 
39. H.R. 269, 10Sth Congo (2003) (under the name "Simplified USA Tax of 2003"). 
40. Id. § 30l. 
41. See id.; see also Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Consumption-Based Tax Reform and the 
State-Local Sector: A Study for the American Tax Policy Institute, 13 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 
115, 122 (1996) (describing the tax base). 
42. See Abreu, supra note 25, at 1366 nn.34-35 (describing the deductions and 
exclusions under the USA tax); Richard J. Joseph, The "Consumption Tax and Flat" 
Taxes Revisited, 69 TAX NOTES 211-12 (1995); Lee A. Sheppard, The Consumption Tax: 
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income by the amount of money they have saved each year. In this 
way, it aims to tax the amount of income that was consumed.43 
4. Value Added and Retail Sales Taxes 
The fourth and final group of proposals are those calling for a 
National Retail Sales Tax ("NRST") or a Value Added Tax (''VAT"). A 
proposal for an NRST has been introduced by Representative Billy 
Tauzin.44 Senator Richard Lugar has also advocated an National 
Sales Tax.45 A transactional VAT similar to those employed in many 
European countries46 would have an impact on states similar to that 
of an NRST. Discussions on Capitol Hill have included a VAT as one 
of the possibilities for revamping the federal tax system, but reform 
proponents have not been employing that terminology to describe 
their proposals.47 Issues arising under these taxes, which seek to tax 
all consumption, include: the logistics of trying to capture all 
transactions in goods and services in a sprawling complex economy; 
the availability of tax exemption for sub-federal government units; 
and the need to avoid the cascade problem of taxing goods that pass 
Borrowing as a Tax Shelter, 68 TAX NOTES 138-41 (1995) (discussing debt issues in 
both Flat Tax and USA Tax). 
43. See Murray Weidenbaum, The Nunn-Domenici USA Tax: Analysis and 
Comparisons in FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM, supra note 25, at 54, 54-57 (describing the 
underlying philosophy of the USA tax and providing an illustration of how the tax 
would be calculated). 
44. H.R. 2717, 107th Congo (2001). 
45. S. Res. 16, 105th Congo (1997). 
46. A Value Added Tax is a mechanism for including all of the output of the 
economy; in effect the tax base is national income. See JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, TAX 
REFORM, THE RICH AND THE POOR 117-20 (2d ed. 1989) (providing an overview of value 
added taxation including a summary of how the tax base is adjusted for investment 
expenditures and how individual returns are adjusted to capture the value added by 
the taxpayer). 
47. Of the proposals receiving serious attention on Capitol Hill, both 
Representative Armey's proposal, H.R. 1040, 107th Congo (2001), and Senator 
Specter's proposal, S. 822, 106th Congo (2000), are essentially subtraction-method 
value added taxes, where "purchases are subtracted from sales and the tax rate is then 
applied to the net figure," PECHMAN, supra note 46, at 118. Neither proposal, however, 
identifies them as such. Former Representative Gibbons had introduced a bill for a 
Value Added Tax in the 104th Congress. H.R. 4050, 104th Congo (1996). The proposals 
that have been made thus far attempt to integrate some of the VAT principles into a 
two-level, business and individual tax as a purported replacement for the income tax. 
See generally Lester B. Synder & Marianne Gallegos, Redefining the Role of the 
Federal Income Tax: Taking the Tax Law "Private" Through the Flat Tax and Other 
Consumption Taxes, 13 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 1 (1996) (discussing proposals that rely "on a 
combination VAT and income tax base"). 
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through many hands (and may be taxed at each step) on their way to 
the ultimate consumer.48 
Each of the proposals outlined above takes a different tack in the 
course of raising federal revenue. Because of the differences among 
the various proposals, they will affect state and municipal finances in 
different ways. Even with that caveat, there are some effects from 
each of the proposals that one can anticipate. 
II. 	 LIKELY EFFECTS OF RADICAL TAX REFORM ON STATE AND LOCAL 
FINANCE 
The effects of reform plans that call for moving away from 
income taxation and toward consumption taxation will be felt far 
beyond the federal treasury. The proposals will affect state and local 
finance in several ways, including by making state and local income 
taxes more difficult to administer, by curtailing state and local 
revenue sources, by disrupting the tax exempt municipal bond 
market, and by hampering the ability of states and municipalities to 
export their tax burdens through federal deductibility. 
A. 	 The Effective Repeal ofState and Local Income Taxes 
State and local governments derive a significant portion of their 
tax revenues from state and local income taxes. The informational 
infrastructure necessary to administer such tax schemes is complex, 
however, so virtually all state and local income taxes "piggyback" on 
the federal income tax for much of the administrative mechanism 
needed to implement such taxes in a fair and efficient manner.49 
State and local tax authorities rely on the federal income tax 
infrastructure in many ways. For example, state and local tax 
agencies utilize federal regulations defining "taxable income and 
allowable deductions," receive copies of taxpayer filings prepared for 
federal authorities, and receive the benefits from both federal audits 
and from legal enforcement actions brought by federal authorities 
against taxpayers.50 They also tap into the national framework of 
48. For a discussion of issues arising under a Value Added Tax and a National 
Retail Sales Tax, see generally Gilbert E. Metcalf, The Role of a Value·Added Tax in 
Fundamental Tax Reform, in FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM, supra note 25, at 91, and 
Stephen Moore, The Economic and Civil Liberties Case for a National Sales Tax, in 
FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM, supra note 25, at 110. 
49. See Holtz-Eakin, supra note 41, at 128-29 (discussing the piggyback effect and 
noting the difficulty with which any given state could maintain the informational 
infrastructure necessary to tax income at the state level if there were not federal tax 
system). 
50. Michael Mazerov et aI., Federal Tax Restructuring and State and Local 
Governments: An Introduction to the Issues and the Literature, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
1459, 1460-61 (1996). 
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informational reporting even though they lack the legal authority to 
compel reporting from nonresident corporations and other entities.51 
Given the immense administrative costs of an income tax system, it 
seems unlikely that any individual state could retain a traditional 
individual or corporate income tax on its own.52 
Although all of the current reform proposals could have 
potentially devastating effects on state and local income taxation 
efforts, it should be noted that the proposals differ in the degree to 
which they hobble existing state and local income taxes. The 
Gephardt flattened tax and the USA tax would leave in place the 
essential national income reporting system and that alone would 
likely permit states to continue to administer their own income taxes. 
Both of these proposals, however, would cause radical changes in the 
definition of the tax base in a way that might not coordinate well 
with the public policy of individual states. The benefits of the current 
"piggyback" approach would be largely lost if the states chose to 
define the tax base in a method inconsistent with the new federal 
base definition and especially if the states desired to exempt from 
tax, or tax at a differential rate, a component of income no longer 
considered special under the federal scheme. In those situations, 
obtaining at the state level the information needed to administer the 
tax (especially from non-resident businesses) would be logistically 
(and perhaps legally) difficult. 
The HalllRabushka-inspired plans and the National Sales or 
Value Added Tax, if enacted, would spell disaster for state-level 
income tax programs. Because federal tax changes that depart 
radically from the traditional model of income taxation would have 
no need for the types of data needed to run an income tax, one would 
assume the federal government will stop collecting that data and 
therefore the federal informational infrastructure necessary for the 
administration of a state income tax would be lost completely. There 
may be some solace for states in that both the USA tax and the 
51. [d. at 1461. 
52. [d. One could contemplate the continuance of state income tax systems where 
Congress either makes changes to the current system but leaves the informational 
infrastructure in place or where the states form a compact among themselves to pool 
their individual jurisdictional authorities and create a nationwide information 
reporting system. See id. at 1475 (discussing the interstate compact idea). In any 
event, if state-level income taxation is to continue, it would require some extraordinary 
mechanism to permit it to do so. Even under the existing tax system, states are fmding 
their traditional methods of determining tax nexus, tax bases, and activity allocation 
increasingly anachronistic in the Internet age. Without some kind of interstate 
coordination of tax information, the current system may be hobbled. See Robert J. 
Cline, Can the Current State and Local Business Tax System Survive the New 
Economy Challenge?, 24 STATE TAX NOTES 241 (Apr. 15, 2002) (commenting on the 
difficulties facing states whose tax agencies must adapt to economic changes). 
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various HalllRabushka style flat tax bills would permit states to 
substitute a broad-based, apportioned, state-level subtraction­
method value added tax for their existing corporate income taxes and 
thereby piggyback on that informational infrastructure. More 
extreme forms of federal taxation reform, however, such as a national 
retail sales tax or a European-style value added tax, would likely 
force the states to repeal their corporate and individual income taxes 
as well.53 
Congress seems to be largely unconscious of the effect that 
wholesale federal income tax reform will have on state and local 
governments' ability to levy income taxes. In the Joint Committee on 
Taxation's study examining the impact of federal income tax reform 
on state and local governments,54 there is only a brief mention of the 
difficulties state and local governments would have in administering 
income taxes in the absence of a federal income tax infrastructure.55 
In light of the seriousness of the disruption such a change would 
cause, the ramifications of federal tax law changes on state level tax 
schemes should receive much more attention. 
B. Curtailing Other Revenue Raising Options 
Fundamental changes at the federal level will cut off some 
revenue-raising options at the state and local level. The imposition of 
a federal sales tax or value-added tax (''VAT''), for example, in 
addition to depriving state and local governments of the option to tax 
income effectively, will precipitate other revenue-raising problems. 
Given state and local governments' dependence on sales tax 
revenues, the addition of a federal level tax on top of existing state 
53. Even in these extreme situations, if Congress repealed the federal tax without 
repealing the federal income tax reporting system, states might nevertheless remain 
able to carry out their income tax schemes. See Mazerov et aI., supra note 50, at 1462 
(opining that absent a decision by Congress to leave reporting schemes intact, a 
decision to repeal the federal income tax would force states to repeal their income 
taxes). 
54. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 104TH CONG., IMPACT ON STATE AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS OF REPLACING THE FEDERAL 
INCOME TAX (Joint Comm. Print 1996). 
55. While the Joint Committee on Taxation was aware of the essential role the 
federal income tax plays in the administration of state income taxes and the potential 
repercussions of federal changes for the states, they nevertheless did not consider the 
implications of scrapping the federal infrastructure to be worthy of more than a 
sentence. [d. at 70 (noting that "[bJecause most of the States that collect individual 
and corporate income taxes model their State income tax systems after the Federal 
income tax system, any significant restructuring of the Federal income tax system 
could have considerable corollary implications for such States"). Without any real 
analysis, the Committee Report merely noted that "the elimination of a Federal 
income tax ... would entail a considerable increase in the complexity and expense of 
administering a State income tax system." [d. 
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and local taxes will create severe policy problems for state and local 
tax authorities.56 Canada experienced similar problems when it 
adopted a VAT in 1991.57 The issues raised by the imposition of a 
federal level sales tax or VAT primarily include eliminating 
competition and promoting coordination between the federal level tax 
and the state and local taxes. A big issue will be how to make the tax 
bases of the two systems similar enough to avoid major compliance 
problems. 
The reality of a combined state and federal sales tax or VAT 
would be a very visible and very large incidence of tax on each and 
every transaction in goods and services. Taxpayers will be reminded 
of the cost of government over and over again in a much more 
immediate way than they are when their income taxes are 
automatically withheld from their paycheck every two weeks. This 
could have several effects on tax policy, including: (a) a "crowding 
out" effect in which the federal tax plus the local tax creates "political 
pressure for immediate reductions in state and local sales taxes"; (b) 
"political pressure brought by the business community" (which must 
collect the sales and VAT taxes) for conforming the state and local 
sales tax base with the federal base "or elimination of the statellocal 
sales taxes entirely"; and (c) administrative issues with federalism 
overtones if states are charged with administering the federal sales 
tax scheme.58 
While the sales tax and VAT approaches are most worrisome, all 
of the reform proposals raise problems for local property taxation 
schemes. To the extent that base-broadening plans eliminate the 
home mortgage interest and property tax deductions, property values 
56. Of course, in the Internet age, state and local reliance on the sales tax is 
already problematic. See generally Charles E. McLure, Jr., Rethinking State and Local 
Reliance on the Retail Sales Tax: Should We Fix the Sales Tax or Discard It?, 2000 
BYU L. REV. 77 (detailing howe-commerce serves to aggravate the defects of the retail 
sales tax). 
57. See Tracy A. Kaye, Show Me the Money: Congressional Limitations on State 
Tax Sovereignty, 35 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 149, 182 (1998) ("Canada enacted the GST 
without the full support and cooperation of all the provinces, and this has caused 
difficulties."); see also Sean C. Aylward, Proposed GST Reforms in Canada Include 
Integrated National, Provincial VAT, 5 J. INT'L TAX'N 473, 473 (1994) (noting that at 
the time of the adoption of the GST, Canada had "ten different broad-base sales taxes, 
eight provincial single-stage sales taxes (in all provinces except Quebec and Alberta), 
and two multi-stage sales taxes (the federal GST and the Quebec QST).... 
Nonetheless, repeated efforts by the [federal) government to negotiate a harmonized 
National Sales Tax failed to win provincial support."). 
58. Mazerov, supra note 50, at 1466-67; see also Holtz-Eakin, supra note 41, at 120 
(noting that as five states do not currently impose a sales tax, asking them to collect a 
federal sales tax would create an awkward situation). 
423 2004] RADICAL TAX REFORM 
are likely to decrease (certainly in the short term).59 Because homes 
are a major component of local real property tax bases, this likelihood 
could lead to a reduction in local property tax revenues in the 
absence of offsetting tax rate increases. Of course, these 
perturbations should only last until the next general assessment, but 
the resulting readjustment of the property tax rate to make the local 
budget balance could be politically difficult or even legally 
impossible, considering that some states impose legal limitations on 
the power of local governments to raise property tax rates.so To 
complicate matters further, this stress on the property tax regime 
will occur at a time when state and local tax authorities already face 
a troubling erosion of the property tax base through federal 
restrictions and preemptions.s1 
In addition, the far-reaching changes in federal tax incentives 
could upset long-standing expectations about sales tax revenues at 
the state and local level. Because one goal of the wholesale shift of 
the federal tax system from taxation of income to taxation of 
consumption is to encourage savings and investment, policy makers 
must worry about the effect that the concomitant expected decrease 
in consumption would have on tax revenues. Given the key role 
played by sales taxes in state and local finance, a significant drop in 
consumption induced by federal tax law changes could reduce 
significantly state and local revenues from their sales taxes. 
59. Dennis R. Capozza et aI., Taxes, Mortgage Borrowing, and Residential Land 
Prices in ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 171, 191 (Henry J. Aaron 
& William G. Gale eds., 1996) (concluding that in the sixty-three metropolitan 
statistical areas ("MSAs") they examined, property values will decrease about five 
percent on average but that some MSAs will experience only a two percent decrease 
while others will lose as much as thirteen percent in value); see Robert Eisner, The 
Proposed Sales and Wages Tax-Fair, Flat, or Foolish? in ROBERT E. HALL, ET AL., 
FAIRNESS AND EFFICIENCY IN THE FLAT TAX 42, 75 (1996) ("[Tlhe elimination of tax 
deductibility for mortgage interest will hit housing hard."). But see Roberta F. Mann, 
The (Not So) Little House on the Prairie: The Hidden Costs of the Home Mortgage 
Interest Deduction, 32 ARIz. ST. L. J. 1347 (2000) (advocating repeal of the deduction 
on the ground that, as currently constituted, the provision encourages urban sprawl 
and is not available to all potential home owners and also on the ground that a repeal 
might induce lower housing prices). 
60. The most famous of these restrictions are California's Proposition 13, CAL. 
CONST. art. XIII §l(a), and Massachusetts' Proposition 2 'h, MASs. ANN. LAws ch. 59, 
§21C (Law Co-op. 1990). See also PECHMAN, supra note 19, at 277 (noting that "ten 
states impose limits on local taxes or expenditures"). 
61. See NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATORS & NAT'L GOVERNORS' AsS'N, 
FINANCING STATE GOVERNMENT IN THE 1990S, at 51-55 (1993) [hereinafter FINANCING 
STATE GOVERNMENT IN THE 1990s1 (describing federal legislation and court decisions 
that have restricted the personal and real property subject to state and local taxation). 
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C. Effect on State / Local Borrowing 
All of the tax reform proposals would have a profound impact on 
the municipal bond market. Every federal income tax act since the 
passage of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913 has contained an 
exemption for the interest from the obligations of state and local 
borrowings from federal income taxation.62 However, although the 
exemption of state and local obligations from federal taxation has a 
long pedigree, it is not required by the Constitution.63 Because there 
is no Constitutional bar to including this source of income, all of the 
major tax reform proposals except some of the flat tax proposals 
either reduce (in the case of the USA tax) or eliminate (flattened tax 
proposals), or render inapplicable (sales tax and VAT) the federal tax 
exemption for interest paid on state and local government 
borrowings.64 The impact of eliminating the federal subsidy on the 
interest expense of state and local government is a matter of debate 
among economists and policy makers.65 What is not at issue, however, 
are the observed effects of tax policy changes and anticipated tax 
policy changes on tax exempt bond spreads-serious talk of tax 
reform narrows the spread between taxable and tax exempt 
obligations, apparently as bond buyers incorporate a heavier discount 
to take account of the possibility of future tax changes.66 In the 1996 
presidential campaign, for example, economists observed an inverse 
62. See ROBERT S. AMDuRSKY & CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, MUNICIPAL DEBT FINANCE 
LAw: THEORY AND PRACTICE 440 (1992) (noting the continuing tax exemption for 
interest on municipal obligations). 
63. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988) (overruling earlier precedent 
and holding that the Constitution does not require that interest on municipal 
obligations be exempted from a nondiscriminatory federal tax on bondholders). 
64. See JOINT COMM. ANALYSIS, supra note 25, at 83-100 (describing the various 
proposals). 
" 65. Compare PECHMAN, supra note 19, at 123-27 (describing the debate about the 
economic justification for the deductibility of state and local bond interest and 
concluding that such an exemption is economically inefficient because the interest 
saved by the borrower is less than half the revenue lost by the Treasury) with Maxwell 
A. Miller & Mark A. Glick, The Resurgence of Federalism: The Case for Tax-Exempt 
Bonds, 1 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 25 (1997) (eschewing conventional analysis of the tax 
exemption as a disguised subsidy that creates an economically inefficient transfer and 
asserting that principles of federalism should preclude the federal-level taxation of 
state and local obligations). 
66. See James M. Poterba, Explaining the Yield Spread Between Taxable and Tax· 
Exempt Bonds: The Role of Expected Tax Policy, in STUDIES IN STATE AND LOCAL 
PuBLIC FINANCE 5 (Harvey S. Rosen ed., 1986) (showing that expected changes in tax 
policy have an important effect on yield spread between taxable and tax exempt 
securities). 
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correlation between candidate Steve Forbes' popularity and the tax 
exempt spread.67 
The importance of tax exempt financing for cities is hard to 
gauge in dollar amounts, but it is substantial by almost anyone's 
reckoning. In 1995, the combined debt load of state and local 
governments in the United States was approximately $1.2 trillion.68 
The federal tax exemption allowed state and local bond issuers to 
save approximately $12.9 billion in interest costS.69 Even small 
changes in the costs of financing an amount that large will translate 
into a very large number. Yet despite the widely understood negative 
impact the tax reform proposals would have on the market for 
municipal debt, only the USA tax makes any attempt to blunt the 
adverse effect.70 The other proposals would wreak havoc in the tax 
exempt market. 
Starting with the flattened-rate tax proposal, the base­
broadening component of that plan would eliminate the tax 
exemption for municipal bonds. The effect of such a change would be 
to force municipal issuers to offer higher yields in order to provide an 
after-tax return to investors commensurate with the return they 
could receive from taxable obligations. Even if political pressures 
were to result in the retention of the exclusion for municipal bond 
interest, the rate-lowering component of the plan would greatly 
reduce the value ofthe tax preference. 71 The implications oflowering 
67. See JOEL SLEMROD & TIMOTHY GREIMEL, DID STEVE FORBES SCARE THE 
MUNICIPAL BOND MARKET? (Nat'l Bureau ofEcon. Research, Working Paper No. 6583, 
1998) (describing the effect of Steve Forbes' political strength (as measured by the 
Iowa Electronic Market, which allows participants to trade on political candidates' 
prospects on the spread of 5 and 30 year municipal obligations and observing a marked 
contraction of the spread on 5 year obligations whenever Forbes' political fortunes 
rose, while finding a more muted effect on 30 year obligations), available at 
http://www.nber.org/paperslw6583. 
68. See Richard Briffault, Public Finance in the American Federal System: Basic 
Patterns and Current Issues, 2 COLUM. J. EURO. L. 533, 546 (1996) (citing figures from 
a Wall Street Journal article). 
69. Id. 
70. The USA tax would continue to provide an exclusion for tax-exempt interest, 
but in light of its rate lowering objective, the value of the tax deduction would be 
diluted significantly. 
71. A simple example illustrates this concept. Let's take an investor in a 
hypothetical high income tax bracket, let's call it forty percent. Let's further stipulate 
that the investor is faced with an investment choice between two equally risky 
securities: a taxable bond carrying a ten percent current yield and a tax exempt bond 
offering a seven percent yield (again, for simplicity's sake let's focus on current yield 
instead of the more appropriate yield to maturity). In a tax-free world, of course the 
investor would take the ten percent security, assuming as stated that the issuers are 
equally risky. But the tax consequences change the dynamics. For the ten percent 
taxable bond, the effective rate of return is only six percent (interest payment of ten 
percent minus forty percent taxes). Since the tax exempt bond offers a seven percent 
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tax rates is obvious-bond yields will go up, and the differential 
between taxable and non-taxable bond rates will narrow even 
further. Under the flattened tax plan, state and local borrowing will 
be adversely affected. Of course, the wealth of current owners of tax 
exempt securities will be adversely affected as well, as the value of 
those bonds will fall once the market demands a higher yield to 
compensate for the lack of tax exemption. 
Under the HalllRabushka inspired plans and the VAT and retail 
sales tax, interest on municipal bonds would not be taxed directly 
either because the interest is explicitly excluded from the tax base or 
because the focus of the tax base is elsewhere. While on first blush 
that appears to be good news for tax exempt issuers, the bad news is 
that all other issuers of debt will be treated the same way. So under 
the HalllRabushka style taxes, the interest on a bond from the City 
of Boston will not be taxable, but the interest on a bond from a 
similarly rated private issuer will not be taxed either. The result, as 
with the flattened tax proposal, will be to eliminate the spread 
between municipal and private debt obligations.72 
The cost of tax exempt financing to the Federal Treasury has 
long been a target for tax reformers who want to improve the 
economic efficiency of the tax system. Yet the elimination of tax 
exemption will increase burdens at the state-local level. Replacing 
tax exemption with a federal interest subsidy to municipalities, as 
has been proposed in the past,73 while sound in theory, will be 
inefficient and costly in practice due to administration costs and 
delay. Additionally, if the federal subsidy is not pegged to the correct 
market rate, it will skew incentives for public borrowing. The 
logistics of budgeting at the federal level for the subsidies arising out 
of state and local activity would be formidable. The possibility of 
official corruption and pork barrel politics are bound to enter any 
return, the investor will take the tax exempt bond. If the investor's marginal rate is 
lowered to twenty five percent, however, the after-tax return on the taxable bond is 
seven and a half percent, so the investor will take the taxable obligation. 
72. Whether municipal yields will rise to meet private yields or private yields will 
fall to meet municipal yields is anyone's guess, but it seems likely that municipalities 
will incur higher costs of borrowing under a flat tax. See DOUGLAS R. SEASE & TOM 
HERMAN, THE FLAT-TAX PRIMER 93 (1996) (noting the difficulty of predicting price 
movements in the bond market, but suggesting that municipalities will pay more 
under a flat tax). 
73. See PEeRMAN, supra note 19, at 126 (noting the idea and the approaches to an 
explicit federal subsidy for state and local borrowing that have been proposed in the 
recent past); see also Who Profits from Tax-Exempt Bonds?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1981, 
at A30 (advocating a direct subsidy to state and local governments). The idea of having 
the federal government pay thirty to forty percent of the debt interest payments owed 
by the states on their debt securities was actually proposed in 1969, but was never 
adopted. TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, H.R. REP. NO. 91-413, at 172-74 (1969). 
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subsidy program. Finally, administrative considerations and the lag 
time of receiving the promised subsidy from the federal government, 
make interest subsidies an unattractive option for state and local 
governments. 
D. 	 Elimination ofExportability Through Federal Deduction of 
State and Local Taxes. 
All of the tax reform proposals would eliminate the deductibility 
of state and local income and property taxes in determining a 
taxpayer's federal tax liability, or render such an adjustment 
irrelevant to the tax base. Under the current arrangement, taxpayers 
who itemize are permitted to deduct from their federal taxable 
income the amount they have paid in state and local taxes (except 
sales tax). The net effect to the taxpayer is to receive a subsidy from 
the federal government for a portion of their local tax liability.74 
Consequently, a portion of local taxes is borne by the nation's 
taxpayers in general. 
Eliminating the deductibility of state and local taxes greatly 
reduces the ability of tax policymakers to "export" the burden of local 
taxes to a larger population.75 Reasonable minds may differ over 
whether exportability is a good idea from a policy point of view. 
Where "local" improvements and infrastructure are technically made 
by a municipality, but benefit an entire metropolitan region, the case 
for exportation is quite strong.76 On the other hand, if there are no 
positive externalities of a locally debt-financed project, the argument 
for exportation is much weaker.77 One could, however, make the case 
that inner cities which serve as commercial and cultural hubs, but 
74. Whether this subsidy is efficient is a debatable question, but it probably is not. 
See Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and the Deductibility of State and Local Taxes 
Under the Federal Income Tax, 82 VA. L. REV. 413, 492 (1996) (concluding that 
arguments in favor of deductibility of state and local taxes are not as strong as the 
contention that the benefits of local government equal the costs imposed through local 
taxes, but fmding ultimate policy decision about the wisdom of the deduction difficult 
and more likely to be decided by political than economic considerations). 
75. State and local governments might still "export" a portion of their tax burden 
by imposing taxes or user fees on activities that are likely to be paid by non-residents, 
such as a hotel room occupancy tax. See Robert D. Ebel, Comment on Tax Exporting 
Federal Deductibility and State Tax Structure," 12 J. OF POL'Y ANALYSIS AND MGMT. 
127, 128-9 (1993) (discussing direct and indirect methods of exportation outside of 
federal deductibility). 
76. See PECHMAN, supra note 19, at 295-97 (making the argument for exporting 
municipal finance costs on the grounds that inner-city infrastructure has positive 
externalities and that the cities themselves may lack the resources to finance the 
improvements). 
77. See, DANIEL SHAVlRO, FEDERALISM IN TAXATION: THE CASE FOR GREATER 
UNIFORMITY 80-81 (1993) ("Without positive externalities from a jurisdiction's 
providing public goods, tax exportation is clearly inconsistent with fiscal federalism."). 
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which may not have a large population, and rural areas that require 
a certain amount of infrastructure, but lack the critical mass of 
taxpayers to make such expenditures affordable, are good candidates 
for appropriate exportation, merely because the nation has an 
interest in maintaining a national infrastructure of government 
services like airports, education, and police. This is so even if 
particular pockets of the country cannot feasibly finance the required 
improvements on the taxpayer base under their jurisdiction. 
In any event, eliminating deductibility of state and local taxes 
from a flattened income tax, or rendering such an adjustment 
irrelevant by enacting one of the other proposals, will have the effect 
of increasing the "tax price" of state and local services.7s This sticker 
shock will undoubtedly have major political consequences for state 
and local governments.79 
Areas of the country where local governments rely more heavily 
on property and income taxes than on sales taxes and user fees will 
be affected more dramatically.so One factor that influences the 
imposition of taxes as opposed to user fees under the current scheme 
of taxation is the availability of the federal tax deduction as a way to 
ameliorate the effect of local taxes. The elimination of that device 
could result in the imposition of more user fees as states and 
localities move away from an ability to pay standard toward a fee for 
services approach to public finance. 
E. Other Effects on State and Local Governments 
It is, of course, impossible to estimate with precision all of the 
effects a fundamental change in federal tax policy will have on any 
aspect of our economy. The four issues discussed above are likely to 
be the biggest problem areas for state and local governments, but it 
is by no means an exhaustive list. For example, the possibility exists 
that under the sales tax proposals, state and local governments 
might not be exempt from taxation and would also be liable for taxes 
on the wages of their employees.sl Although this and other effects 
may pose serious problems for state and local governments, they will 
not be discussed here. 
78. See, e.g., Martin S. Feldstein & Gilbert E. Metcalf, The Effect of Federal Tax 
Deductibility on State and Local Taxes and Spending, 95 J. OF POL. ECON. 710 (1987); 
Gilbert E. Metcalf, Tax Exporting, Federal Deductibility, and the Tax Structure, 12 J. 
OF POL'y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 109 (1993). 
79. See infra notes 203-05 and accompanying text. 
80. See Capozza et al., supra note 59, at 191-92 (concluding that the adverse 
impact of the elimination of property tax deductibility will be greatest in the Northeast 
and lightest in the South). 
81. See Holtz-Eakin, supra note 41, at 120-22 (describing the effects of the 
proposals). 
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III. GOALS OF TAX POLICY 
Traditionally, the rhetoric of tax policy requires that tax 
proposals be justified in terms of several key criteria-equity, 
efficiency, simplicity, and stability. In a perfect world, tax revenues 
should be collected as fairly as possible, produce as little unintended 
distortion in the economy as possible, be as simple to administer, 
comply with, and understand as possible, and be predictable and 
reliable enough to allow both the public and private sectors to make 
long run economic plans. These goals are easier to state than they 
are to achieve. 
A. Equity 
Discussions of "equity" in tax policy generally break the concept 
into categories of "horizontal equity" and "vertical equity." The tax 
reform proposals under consideration will have a major effect on both 
of these ideas. 
1. Horizontal Equity 
A common theme in American tax policy has been that 
individuals with equal ability to pay taxes should pay the same 
amount of tax. A tax system which possesses this quality is said to 
possess horizontal equity.s2 Under our present tax system, the 
principle of horizontal equity is sometimes violated. In some cases, 
individuals in similar circumstances bear different tax burdens 
because some forms of income are exempt from tax while others are 
taxed at favorable rates.S3 
Under an income tax, horizontal equity is primarily a function of 
how comprehensively taxable income is defined. If "income" from all 
sources is taxed (and taxed at the same rate) then horizontal equity 
would be achieved. In this regard, the flattened tax proposal 
advances the goal of horizontal equity, but the other plans do not. 
The tax reform proposals discussed in this Article purport to increase 
equity in the tax system, but the new base definitions open new 
areas of horizontal inequity. The most obvious problem is that in the 
attempt to bolster savings and investment by making interest and 
82. See Eric M. Zolt, The Uneasy Case For Uniform Taxation, 16 VA. TAX REV. 39, 
87-88 (1996) (discussing the concept of horizontal equity and differences of opinion 
about how it should be defmed). 
83. For example, if Taxpayer A receives his income from wages and Taxpayer B 
receives her income from capital gains and interest on municipal bonds, then Taxpayer 
A pays a significantly higher tax because capital gains and municipal bond interest 
income are given a tax break. under current law. 
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dividend income tax exempt, the reforms would not eliminate 
problems of horizontal equity, but would merely reconfigure them.84 
2. Vertical Equity 
While horizontal equity seeks equal treatment of individuals in 
similar economic positions, vertical equity seeks to ensure that 
individuals with greater ability to pay tax do in fact pay more tax.85 
Not all participants in the tax debate embrace the idea of vertical 
equity, as it seems linked in many minds with income redistribution 
and party politics.86 Where horizontal equity is concerned more with 
the tax base, vertical equity is concerned with the tax rate 
structure.B7 While the tax rate levied in a tax system is a function of 
84. See Eisner, supra note 59, at 44 (noting that "the flat tax substitutes serious 
new distortions for those it would eliminate"). 
85. See Nancy C. Staudt, The Hidden Costs ofthe Progressivity Debate, 50 VAND. L. 
REV. 919, 933-58 (1997) (providing an exhaustive discussion of the concept of vertical 
equity from several theoretical points of view). One commonly offered justification for 
progressive income taxation is based on the idea of the declining marginal utility of 
income. Id. at 941-45. Progressive taxes assume the declining marginal utility of 
income. Id. From this theory it follows that the 100,000th dollar of income to a wealthy 
person has a lower marginal utility than the 100th dollar of income to a poor person. 
Id. Relatively speaking, a wealthy person's dollars are worth less than a poor person's, 
and so wealthy people should pay more taxes as a portion of their income than poor 
people do. Id. Conversely, one might think that paying taxes hurts less as wealth 
increases. Id.; see also Vada Waters Lindsey, The Widening Gap Under the Internal 
Revenue Code: The Need for Renewed Progressivity, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 8 (2001) 
(arguing that "any defmition of fairness must incorporate the ability to pay concept"). 
Flat tax advocates vehemently disagree with the declining marginal utility theory of 
money and find it an unconvincing justification for progressivity. See WALTER J. BLUM 
& HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 56-63 (1953) 
(making the argument against the declining marginal utility of money). For a fine 
collection of essays surveying the topic of taxing the rich, see DOES ATLAS SHRUG? THE 
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH (Joel B. Slemrod ed., 2000). 
86. The Earned Income Tax Credit has been a battleground for the fairness issue 
for some time. See Shailagh Murray, Tax 'Fairness' Feud Rages On, WALL ST. J., June 
11, 2003, at A4. The rhetoric accompanying this fight belies the class warfare lurking 
just below its surface. In a regrettable editorial entitled The Non-Taxpaying Class, the 
Wall Street Journal labeled as "lucky duckies" those taxpayers whose income was so 
low after adjustments and tax credits that they owed no federal income tax. Editorial, 
The Non-Taxpaying Class, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 2002, at A20. Shortly thereafter, Paul 
Krugman in the New York Times, took the Journal to task for having the audacity to 
consider the hypothetical taxpayer earning $12,000 to be a "lucky duck." The Journal 
had focused solely on federal income taxes and had ignored the fact that this low­
income earner had paid about 20% of his income in payroll taxes. Paul Krugman, Hey, 
Lucky Duckies!, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2002, at A3l. 
87. There are basically three ways a rate structure could be established: 
progressively, where the ratio of tax liability to tax base increases as tax base 
increases; proportionally, where the tax liability to tax base ratio is constant as tax 
base increases; and regressively, where tax liability to tax base ratio decreases as tax 
base increases. See generally RONALD C. FISHER, STATE AND LOCAL PuBLIC FINANCE 
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revenue needs and tax base capacity, the tax rate structure is a value 
judgment on the part of policy makers informed more by philosophy 
than by economics.88 Progressivity has been incorporated into the 
federal income tax since the original act in 1913.89 Of course, 
progressive tax rates are not the only option available. True flat tax 
proposals are proportional in nature,90 while the VAT and sales tax 
proposals are likely to have a regressive tax incidence.91 
In other words, vertical equity says that an individual with a 
larger income should pay an appropriate amount more in taxes than 
an individual with a smaller income.92 Vertical equity is a more 
subjective concept than horizontal equity, since it involves the 
comparison of ability to pay between taxpayers with different 
amounts of resources. Consequently, no one notion of vertical equity 
enjoys universal support.93 Flat tax proponents claim to support the 
idea of vertical equity by focusing not on the percentage of tax paid, 
303 (2d ed. 1996) (providing definitions of progressive, proportional and regressive tax 
incidence). 
88. For an explicit application of philosophy to the problem of tax rate structure, 
compare Donna M. Byrne, Locke, Property, and Progressive Taxes, 78 NEB. L. REV. 700 
(1999) (using John Locke's theory of property to support a progressive tax rate 
structure) with Arthur Cockfield, Income Taxes and Individual Liberty: A Lockean 
Perspective on Radical Consumption Tax Reform, 46 S.D. L. REV. 8 (2001) (using 
Locke's philosophy to justify a consumption tax). 
89. See Bank, supra note 3, at 397 (noting that the 1913 income tax instituted 
"mildly progressive income tax rates" but moved the overall tax burden toward 
proportionality and away from regressivity). 
90. See John F. Coverdale, Comment, The Flat Tax is Not a Fair Tax, 20 SETON 
HALL LEGIS. J. 285, 288-89 (1996) (criticizing flat tax claims of fairness on the grounds 
that it is not fair to tax everyone at the same rate due to the decreasing marginal 
utility of money). 
91. Gerald P. Moran, Tax Amnesty: An Old Debate as Viewed from Current Public 
Choices, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 307, 313 n.18 (1993). 
92. In one sense, vertical equity is the embodiment of one of the two (sometimes 
competing) general guiding principles in tax incidence-ability to pay versus payment 
for benefit received. See PAUL SAMUELSON, Economic Role of Government: Federal 
Taxation and Local Finance, in ECONOMICS 163, 164-65 (10th ed. 1976), reprinted in 
POLICY READINGS IN INDIVIDUAL TAXATION 2, 3 (Philip F. Postlewaite ed., 1980) 
(noting the general guiding principles of tax policy-taxes should be paid by those who 
enjoy the benefit from the publicly provided goods and services and people should be 
taxed in a way that the burden is spread out as equitably as possible and everyone 
bears an appropriate level of sacrifice). 
93. See HALL & RABuSHKA, supra note 15, at 28 (criticizing the idea of vertical 
equity as an intellectual construct invented by "politicians and intellectuals" to justify 
redistribution of income to attain egalitarian social goals at the expense of "individual 
freedom and self-reliance"); Robert P. Strauss, The Effects of a Flat Federal 
Consumption Tax on the States, 88 NAT'L TAX AsS'N !'ROC. 10, 13 (1995) ( "The 'proper' 
degree of vertical equity achieved through progressivity is typically described as a 
value judgment, which honorable people can disagree about and which we expect the 
political process to adjudicate."). 
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but rather on the differences in the absolute dollar amount of taxes 
paid. In their view, the rich pay more than the less aflluent in 
absolute dollar terms and that should satisfy concerns about vertical 
equity. 
Part of the difficulty of assessing the federal taxation scheme on 
the grounds ofvertical equity stems from a failure to agree on exactly 
what should be considered in the tax burden when assessing 
progressivity, proportionality, and regressivity. In our present tax 
system, studies have historically shown that the federal income tax 
has some degree of progressivity, but when combined with state and 
local levels of taxation the aggregate tax burden is roughly 
proportionaP' State and local taxes such as sales and property taxes, 
are notoriously regressive, but their regressive aspect is balanced out 
by the progressivity of the federal income tax. If the primary federal 
tax were shifted to a less progressive structure, a proportional 
structure, or even a regressive structure, the over-all tax burden 
would be skewed toward regressivity.95 
Therefore, from the equity perspective, a flat rate tax would 
preserve horizontal equity, as would the VAT and the sales tax, but 
the USA or Armey proposals would not, since taxpayers in similar 
situations will not be treated similarly. As far as vertical equity is 
concerned, however, adoption of any of the tax reform plans would 
require a redefinition of that concept as it has been traditionally 
understood. 
94. See DON FULLERTON & DIANE LIM ROGERS, WHO BEARS THE LIFETIME TAX 
BURDEN? 5-6 (1993) (building on the tradition of earlier studies and concluding that 
income tax, even after 1986 changes, remains progressive, even over a lifetime, 
whereas sales and excise taxes are regressive, and taxes on capital, while progressive, 
affect wealthy and poor more than middle income over a lifetime); JOSEPH A. 
PECHMAN, WHO PAID THE TAXES, 1966-1985? 10 (1985) (concluding that, depending on 
the assumptions employed, the overall tax burden in the United States is either 
moderately progressive or slightly regressive, and noting that overall progressivity 
declines from 1966 to 1985 due to the increased importance of the payroll tax); JOSEPH 
A. PECHMAN & BENJAMIN A. OKNER, WHO BEARS THE TAX BURDEN? 62 (1974) (fmding 
federal tax burden to be clearly progressive and overall burden roughly proportional). 
95. See Jane G. Gravelle, The Distributional Effects ofFundamental Tax Revisions, 
33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1419 (1996) (analyzing the anticipated tax incidence of the tax 
proposals and finding a regressive impact). But see Joseph Bankman & Barbara H. 
Fried, Winners and Losers in the Shift to a Consumption Tax, 86 GEO. L.J. 539, 561-65 
(1998) (viewing distributional effects of a shift to a consumption tax through a lifecycle 
perspective, and noting that, although the tax incidence remains regressive, the 
regressivity fades significantly). 
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B. Economic Efficiency 
Efficiency is often advanced as a goal of tax policy.96 In practice, 
the public policy debate carried on under the heading of "efficiency" 
centers on the idea that taxes should interfere as little as possible 
with the values of resources in the marketplace.97 Taxes tend to 
reduce efficiency in the economy because they distort the price 
mechanism. The price paid by a consumer will exceed the price 
received by the seller. Consequently, the imposition of a tax creates a 
dead weight 10ss.98 
Although tax policy should strive to be efficient and not to 
interfere with market choices, all taxes are inherently inefficient 
since they invariably affect choices in the marketplace.99 Sometimes 
the distortion caused by the imposition of a tax creates an inequity, 
and policy makers must choose between pursuing the goal of equity 
or the goal of efficiency.loo The most obvious cases where equity and 
efficiency are compromised is in the situation where Congress allows 
96. See Zolt, supra note 82, at 43 (noting that the idea of "efficiency" in the 
taxation area means "different things to different people"-it could stand for the idea 
that taxes should interfere in the market as little as possible, or that taxes should 
attempt to correct market failures, or "it could mean reducing or removing taxes" to 
bolster economic growth). 
97. See FISHER, supra note 87, at 303-04 (defining the concept). 
98. See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 318-22 
(1989) (describing the impact of a tax on buyers and sellers). 
99. These effects can be quite deeply embedded and insidious, as in the way the 
tax code plays into traditional gender roles. See Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and 
Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional Choices, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2001, 2033­
36 (1996) (describing the effect of certain aspects of the current income tax, such as 
joint filing and the level of marginal rates in the context of how those attributes affect 
women). Some scholars would maintain that the appearance of neutrality is illusory. 
See TAXING AMERICA (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996) (providing 
an anthology of critical tax theory scholarship that points out that, despite the law's 
claim to objectivity, it has a continuing impact on traditionally subordinated groups 
along gender, racial, and economic lines). Similarly, when tax law makes contributions 
to churches tax deductible, it gets into messy choices implicating the First 
Amendment. See generally Erika King, Tax Exemptions and the Establishment Clause, 
49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 971 (1999), Randy Lee, When a King Speaks of God; When God 
Speaks to a King: Faith, Politics, Tax Exempt Status, and the Constitution in the 
Clinton Administration, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 391 (2000). 
100. See Emanuel S. Burstein, Deductions, Credits, Exemptions, and Exclusions in 
the Federal Income Tax System: A Discussion of Public Policy Issues, in 7 STUDIES IN 
TAXATION, PuBLIC FINANCE AND RELATED SUBJECTS-A COMPENDIUM 68, 74 (1983) 
(noting the need of policy makers to balance inequity and costs against benefits). But 
see Patrick B. Crawford, The Utility of the Efficiency / Equity Dichotomy in Tax Policy 
Analysis, 16 VA. TAX REV. 501 (1997) (arguing that the traditional distinction between 
"equity" and "efficiency" is a false dichotomy because they overlap substantially and 
the content given to those terms is necessarily informed by value judgments of the 
analyst). 
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tax deductions, exemptions, credits, or exclusions. In a situation 
where a tax expenditure exists, economic efficiency suffers and the 
tax burden is shifted from those who can take advantage to those 
who can not. The intuitive response to the problem created by tax 
expenditures is to broaden the tax base by eliminating tax 
preferences. 
Relatively high tax rates can create economic inefficiencies as 
well. Lower tax rates in general reduce inefficiencies, although, in 
any given situation, it is difficult to determine exactly how economic 
behavior will change in response to a given change in tax law. lOl 
Proponents of radical tax reform often make the case that 
fundamental change in the tax system is needed in order to boost the 
very low level of household saving in the United States and thereby 
help our economy generally.102 Past experiments with tax-based 
saving incentives, however, have not had a strong track record in 
demonstrating the value of tax policy as a tool for stimulating 
widespread consumer-level savings. 103 
101. For example, it is sometimes thought that high marginal rates are a 
disincentive to work, but it is not clear how lowering the marginal rates would affect a 
worker's consumption of leisure. In theoretical terms, the change in tax liability 
(income effect) and the change in marginal tax rate (substitution effect) would give 
individuals opposing incentives, one to work more, the other to consume more leisure. 
A simple example illustrates the predicament. Consider the case of a high-income, self­
employed professional who can choose to divide his time between working and 
vacationing as he pleases, A flat rate tax is imposed and his marginal rate plummets 
from the current highest rate of 38.6% to, say, 17%, and he receives a tax cut of 
$20,000. He is faced with a choice: should he work more to take advantage of his 
higher after-tax wage, or should he use his extra $20,000-plus to fmance longer and 
more extravagant vacations? Analysts generally conclude that these two opposing 
forces nearly cancel out each other in the general economy, at least in the male labor 
market. There may be distorting income effects for the female workforce, however, 
that make a progressive tax more inefficient than a proportional tax. See Jerry A. 
Hausman, Labor Supply, in How TAXES AFFECT ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 27-83 (Henry J. 
Aaron & Joseph A. Pechman eds., 1981) (describing the substitution and income 
effects of a tax on income in a theoretical context). Empirical evidence seems to 
suggest the relationship between tax rates and hours worked may rest on shaky 
grounds. See Gene Koretz, How Tax Cuts Affect the Rich, BuS. WK., Oct. 19, 1998, at 
18 (describing a study by economists at Johns Hopkins and Purdue that found no 
increase in work time of highly compensated men after the significant marginal rate 
cuts of the 1986 Tax Act, probably because they were already working as much as they 
could already). 
102. See, e.g., Bill Archer, Goals ofFundamental Tax Reform, in FRONTIERS OF TAX 
REFORM, supra note 25, at 3, 4. 
103. See Richard H. Thaler, How to Get Real People to Save, in PERSONAL SAVING, 
CONSUMPrION, & TAX POLICY 143-44 (Marvin H. Kosters ed., 1992). 
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Another boon to efficiency claimed by proponents of flat taxes 
would be a reduction in the activity of the underground economy.104 
Others counter that such claims are perhaps too optimistic and note 
that participants in the underground economy will still have 
incentives to avoid taxes even after a major tax reform. lOS Given that 
much of the underground economy is engaged in illegal activities or 
results from intentional evasion of the tax system, it seems unlikely 
that the participants in the underground economy will come clean 
just because the tax system changes. lOG To the extent the 
underground economy includes people who just do not pay their taxes 
because they believe the tax system is illegitimate, however, radical 
reform may result in increased voluntary compliance. 107 
C. Simplicity. 
Simplicity has always been a goal of tax policy,108 but over the 
years it has proved elusive. l09 Even judges and tax professionals can 
become exasperated by the intricate cross-references and layering of 
tax provisions.lIo Sensing the public's frustration with a complicated 
104. See Dick Armey, Why America Needs the Flat Tax, in FAIRNESS AND 
EFFICIENCY IN THE FLAT TAX, supra note 59, at 96, 99 (noting among other things, his 
belief that a flat tax will pick up members of the underground economy). 
105. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF 
COMPREHENSIVE TAX REFORM 47 (1997) (noting the likely persistence of the 
underground economy because "[aln imbalance would continue to exist in the way 
taxes treat unreported and reported economic activities."). 
106. See Barry Molefsky, America's Underground Economy, in 6 STUDIES IN 
TAXATION, PuBLIC FINANCE AND RELATED SUBJECTS-A COMPENDIUM 294, 294 (1982) 
(describing the underground economy and noting that the participants therein either 
are engaged in illegal activity, intentionally fail to report income, or avoid income 
taxation through non-cash transactions that should be, but often are not, reported). 
107. Taxpayers in the United States are remarkably conscientious about paying 
taxes voluntarily. The phenomenon of U.S. tax compliance is likely the result of a well­
established social norm. See generally Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The 
Case ofTax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781 (2000). 
108. Even in the halcyon days of 1923, the Supreme Court voiced frustration at the 
apparent illogic of the tax code: "Logic and taxation are not always the best of friends." 
Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U.S. 506,521-22 (1923) (McReynolds, J., concurring). 
109. Even when the government sets out to examine the problem of simplification, 
as it did in 2001 when the Joint Committee on Taxation presented a study on the 
topic, STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE 
OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION, PuRSUANT 
TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986 (Comm. Print 2001), 
the political realities of how to frame the problem, and what to suggest as solutions, 
cloud the issue to the point where analysis is lost. For a critique of the government's 
effort at studying simplification, see Mark E. Erwin, A Policy Analysis and Critique of 
the Joint Committee on Taxation's Simplification Study, 56 TAX LAW. 625 (2003). 
110. See Peter L. Faber, Complexity in the Tax Laws and Tax Reform: A Modern 
Fable, 4 J. CORP. TAX'N 42 (1977) (providing an entertaining example of the infuriating 
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tax code, advocates of major tax reform have used a desire to simplify 
the law as one of their major rallying cries. lll Simplicity is desirable 
in order to minimize the costs of compliance and to preserve the 
perception of equity.ll2 Yet under a legislative scheme of any 
sophistication, including our current system of income taxation, there 
are limits on how simple a law can be.1I3 Defining a key idea like 
"income," for example, can be a rather vexing exercise,114 requiring a 
voluminous set of regulations to describe eligibility for all of the 
deductions, exclusions, exemptions, and credits involved in 
determining the tax base. In a world where scholars argue whether 
legal rules are determinate, complexity is bound to expand as 
lawmakers attempt to narrow down the range of possible 
interpretations for a given rule.1I5 Some scholars suggest that 
complexity is inevitable and ultimately beneficial.1I6 
complexity of tax code cross references from a practitioner's point of view); Farley P. 
Katz, The Infernal Revenue Code, 50 TAX LAW. 617 (1997) (providing a handy 
compendium of colorful language from court opinions lamenting the damning 
complexity of income tax provisions); Fowler W. Martin, IRS Workers Can't Answer 
Tax Questions: Taxpayers Seeking Help Often Received Wrong Advice, WALL ST. J., 
May 14, 2001, at B7 (reporting on an audit by the Inspector General of the IRS of the 
Service's 500 Taxpayer Assistance Centers which found that the IRS personnel often 
gave erroneous advice). 
111. Some observers even suggest that the extremely complicated provisions of the 
1997 Tax Act were intentionally made as convoluted as possible in order to build 
public support for reform. See Mike McNamee, Now That We've Made Taxes More 
Complex, Let's Simplify Them, Bus. WK., Sept. I, 1997, at 45; Tom Herman, Tax 
Report, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20,1997, at AI. 
112. See JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO 
THE GREAT DEBATE OVER TAX REFORM 134 (1996) (noting that excess complexity 
affects all taxpayers for two reasons: unsophisticated taxpayers suspect that 
sophisticated taxpayers are taking advantage of loopholes, thereby skewing equity, 
and high tax compliance costs are passed along to everyone as higher prices). 
113. Scholars have studied the problem of complexity from a number of different 
angles. See Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 150 (1995) (using economic theory to examine the optimal level of 
complexity in light of costs on actors of dealing with the complexity); see also Eric 
Kades, The Laws of Complexity and the Complexity of Laws: The Implications of 
Computational Complexity Theory for the Law, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 403 (1997) 
(applying computational complexity theory to legal rules to get a perspective on the 
complexity of rules as a function of the size of the case they apply to). 
114. For a provocative article about why the definition of "income" matters in the 
larger debate about radical tax reform, see Eric M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, the 
Sixteenth Amendment, and the Meaning of "Incomes, n 33 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1057, 1061 
(2001) (noting that the Constitution prohibits the federal government from levying 
unapportioned direct taxes on the People except in the case permitted by the Sixteenth 
Amendment-taxes on incomes). 
115. For a general discussion of the interaction among indeterminacy of rules and 
the complexity and fairness of the tax system, see John A. Miller, Indeterminacy, 
Complexity, and Fairness: Justifying Rule Simplification in the Law of Taxation, 68 
WASH. L. REV. 1 (1993). That is not to say that precise rules are always the best rules; 
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Nevertheless, critics of the current system frequently make 
rhetorical use of the physical size of the collected tax-related 
legislation, regulation, instructions, and guidance, as if the sheer 
volume of the material is what makes the tax law complicated.l17 Yet 
somewhat counterintutitively, the large volume of tax-related legal 
material may actually make taxes simpler. 1lS Conventional wisdom 
also holds that more complex provisions promote the goal of fairness 
by allowing the law to be tailored to fit specific family situations. ll9 
The policy decision oftrading off simplicity for fairness is in the end a 
normative decision informed by individual values.12o Some amount of 
complexity seems inevitable in order to attain an acceptable level of 
accuracy in measuring the tax base. l2l Conservatives would generally 
find that the fine tuning is not worth the cost of the complexity.122 
depending on the goals of the given regulatory scheme, vague rules may serve better. 
See David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 
CORNELL L. REV. 1627 (1999); see also Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, The Vagueness of 
Limits and the Desired Distribution ofConducts, 32 CONN. L. REV. 451 (2000). 
116. See, e.g., Samuel A. Donaldson, The Easy Case Against Tax Simplification, 22 
VA. TAX REV. 645, 650-53 (2003) (arguing that (1) complexity is "either inevitable or 
net beneficial" in that it is a tradeoff for achieving goals of equity or efficiency; (2) the 
alleged harms from complexity are anecdotal, at best; (3) proposed remedies to 
complexity are themselves complex or they over-correct the problem; and (4) simplicity 
itself is nothing special, but should be understood as being an adjunct to the goals of 
efficiency and equity). 
117. Rep. Chabot of Ohio, for instance, has made the point that the tax code is "four 
times the length of the Bible." 146 CONGo REC. H2128 (daily ed. Apr. 12,2000). 
118. See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 112, at 130 ("In fact, having a detailed set 
of rules could make things simpler, to the extent it clears up gray areas in the tax 
law."); Boris I. Bittker, Tax Reform and Tax Simplification, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 
(1974), reprinted in POLICY READINGS IN INDIVIDUAL TAXATION, supra note 92, at 356 
(noting that simple provisions often leave taxpayers to second-guess the IRS or a court 
about how a provision will be applied, while intricate, even complicated, provisions 
help taxpayers comply with the law and make safe decisions). 
119. See Joel Slemrod, Which Is the Simplest Tax System of Them All?, in 
ECONOMIC EFFECI'S OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM, supra note 59, at 355, 380 ("Some 
complexity buys the capacity to fine-tune tax liability-to 'personalize' it-according to 
family characteristics."). 
120. The alternative minimum tax, a notoriously complicated area of tax law, is an 
attempt to achieve horizontal equity. Reasonable minds can differ over whether the 
gains in equity are worth the added complexity. See Shailagh Murray, Firestorm 
Looms on Minimum Tax, WALL ST. J., July 1,2003, at A4. 
121. See Louis Kaplow, Accuracy, Complexity, and the Income Tax, 14 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 61, 61 (1998) (examining the trade-off between accuracy and complexity, taking 
into account compliance costs and the provision of appropriate incentives for taxpayers 
to acquire the information necessary to comply with the law). 
122. See RICHARD A. EpSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 39 (1995). 
Epstein states: 
The only question for the legal system is how it will make its errors, not 
whether it will make them. Simple rules are adopted by people who 
acknowledge that possibility of error up front, and then seek to minimize it 
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Philosophical issues of complexity aside, however, as a practical 
matter, for most taxpayers the portion of the current law that applies 
to their situation is not all that complex.123 The Internal Revenue 
Service has made great strides to simplify taxpayer filing with 
streamlined forms, detailed instructions, and simple tax tables. In 
2000, approximately 40% of all taxpayers filed one of the abbreviated 
forms.124 Despite the incredibly simple directions and requirements 
for filling out these simple forms, however, over 4.4% of the form 
1040EZ filers and over 14.5% of the form 1040A filers submitted 
returns that included a paid preparer's signature.125 The need for 
professional assistance could be the result of a complex tax code, but 
the forms at issue here are truly simple.126 A better explanation is 
that most taxpayers have a very modest complexity horizon127 when it 
comes to taxation issues.128 That many Americans fmd their taxes 
complicated129 should come as no surprise in light of the terrifyingly 
high number of Americans who have trouble reading a bus 
in practice. Complex rules are for those who have an unattainable vision of 
perfection. 
[d. 
123. See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 112, at 130 (suggesting that most 
taxpayers do not spend much time on their taxes). 
124. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 22 SOl BULLETIN 153 (Winter 2002-2003) 
(providing table with data on individual returns showing that, of the 129,373,500 total 
returns ftled in 2000,28,826,589 were made on form 1040A and 21,700,809 were made 
on form 1040EZ). 
125. [d. at 153, 194 (providing data on returns ftled in 2000 by type of form and 
number of returns that included a paid preparer's signature). 
126. Although there is scant data to verifY the trend, the high number of paid 
preparers on simple returns might be evidence that many low-income taxpayers are 
availing themselves oftax refund lending schemes offered by paid preparers. 
127. See JOHN ALLEN PAULOS, A MATHEMATICIAN READS THE NEWSPAPER 120-25 
(1995) (discussing the idea of a complexity horizon). Paulos defines the complexity 
horizon as being the limit of a person's comprehension beyond which "social laws, 
events, and regularities are so complex as to be unfathomable, seemingly random. 
Applied loosely and casually, the term is useful in referring to discriminations that are 
impossibly subtle for a given group of people at a given point in time." [d. at 120. 
128. Consider, for example, that the General Accounting Office found that about 
510,000 federal income tax ftlers in 1998 elected the standard deduction instead of 
itemizing their deductions, even though they had mortgage interest deductions that 
exceeded the standard deduction. The average overpayment amount was $610. See 
UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. NO. GAO-01-529, TAX 
DEDUCTIONS: ESTIMATES OF TAXPAYERS WHO MAy HAVE OVERPAID FEDERAL TAXES BY 
NOT ITEMIZING 2 (2001), available at http://www.gao.gov. 
129. In a recent poll conducted by the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard 
together with NPR and the Kaiser Family Foundation, eighty-seven percent of 
respondents considered the current federal income tax system to be either "very 
complex" or "somewhat complex." National Public RadiolKaiser Family 
FoundationlKennedy School of Government, National Survey of Americans' Views on 
Taxes (April 26, 2003), at http://www.npr.org/news/specials/polls/taxes2003/index.html. 
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schedule.130 It is somewhat surprising that more filers do not require 
assistance. 131 
Nevertheless, even if the complexity argument does not fit the 
facts as well as its proponents would like it to, a simpler system 
might cost less to comply with. The cost of tax compliance includes 
the costs of tax record keeping, reporting, and planning along with 
more subtle societal costS.132 Administration of and compliance with 
the tax code can be costly and time consuming. In addition to the 
costs of compliance, unnecessary complexity eats away at taxpayer 
respect for, and voluntary compliance with, the tax law. Complexity 
can affect horizontal equity because similarly situated taxpayers may 
pay different amounts of tax because they do not share the same 
ability to understand the law or get professional tax counseling. 
Taxpayers may suspect that complexity is a cover for some to pay 
less than others; and this could mean that taxpayers lose faith in the 
equity of the tax system.133 Indeed, it has been suggested that 
130. In a startling study by the Department of Education in conjunction with the 
Educational Testing Service, more than 26,000 American adults were tested on 
practical, every-day matters such as reading newspaper articles, filling in simple 
forms, and answering questions involving basic math skills. The test's results were 
categorized into five levels of competence. Extrapolating from the test results, 
approximately forty to forty-four million Americans perform at the lowest level, 
meaning they are unable to calculate the total of a purchase, determine the difference 
in price between two items, read a street map, or enter information on a simple form. 
It also indicates that an additional fifty million perform at the second-lowest level: 
they are unable to answer specific questions about facts in a newspaper article or to 
interpret charts summarizing information. With regard to the rest of the competence 
levels, the test found that sixty million Americans function with middle-level skills, 
and thirty-four to forty million function at the two highest levels. IRWIN S. KIRSCH ET 
AL, ADULT LITERACY IN AMERICA xiii-xv (1993); see Tamara Henry, College-Level 
Literacy "Less Than Impressive,» USA TODAY, Dec. 12, 1994, at Al (reporting the 
results of an Educational Testing Service study of college-educated adults that found, 
among other things, that about half of four-year college educated adults could not read 
a bus schedule). 
131. The IRS reports that many errors found on tax returns have nothing to do with 
the complexity of the tax law but are instead the result of sloppiness or poor reading 
and arithmetic skills. Karen Hube, IRS Has a Gripe Too: Sloppy Taxpayers, WALL ST. 
J., May 13, 1999, at C1. 
132. See Sheldon D. Pollack, Tax Complexity, Reform, and the Illusions of Tax 
Simplification, 2 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 319, 357 (1994) ("The present system of 
taxation has contributed much to the bureaucratization of modern life and the 
increased regulation of economic life, both for individuals as well as businesses."); see 
also JAMES L. PAYNE, COSTLY RETURNS: THE BURDENS OF THE U.S. TAX SYSTEM 127-48 
(1993) (detailing a long list of "[elmotional, [mloral, and [clultural [closts" of the 
current tax system, including the use of coercion, invasion of privacy, abuse of power, 
infringement of freedom of speech, and violation of conscience). 
133. See Charles E. McLure, Jr., Comments to Henry J. Aaron, Lessons for Tax 
Reform, in Do TAXES MATTER? THE IMPACT OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 332, 
333 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1990) (opining that, before the 1986 Tax Act, the proliferation of 
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lawmakers prefer a complex tax code because intricate prOVISIOns 
allow them to raise taxes on some groups and lower taxes on other 
groups without political accountability!34 
Proponents of flat rate taxes portray them as the ultimate in tax 
simplification.13s While it is likely that the elimination of certain tax 
expenditures and some other aspects of the new proposals will result 
in some simplification, similar simplicity gains could be achieved 
through reform of the existing tax scheme.13s Enactment of the new 
tax plans would bring new complexity problems. For example, by 
taxing income that is now exempt, tax compliance will become more 
complicated. Paying taxes on the interest from municipal bonds as 
contemplated under the flattened tax proposal would entail a whole 
new layer of bureaucracy at the federal level to keep track of bond 
issues and to make sure they are reported. The simplicity gains 
under the flattened tax from switching to an exemption-free tax base 
would in all likelihood be offset, if not outweighed, by administrative 
headaches of keeping track of the newly taxable aspects of the 
broadened tax base, such as the interest on municipal bonds. 
The claim by some that tax returns would be simplified enough 
to fit on a postcard is without a doubt exaggerated.137 The space on 
the current return for taxpayer's name, address and other clerical 
information exceeds the area of a five inch by eight inch postcard. A 
flat tax would not eliminate the need for this information. While 
repeal of tax expenditures would eliminate some lines, the inclusion 
of new types of income would add lines. Much of the information 
required on the forms is there so the IRS can check compliance 
without a full-scale audit. Elimination of items such as dividend and 
tax preferences and tax shelters created the impression that the tax system was unfair 
and that the 1986 Tax Act's curtailment of tax preferences and tough anti-shelter 
provisions "were crucial for improving the perception of fairness"). 
134. Robert L. Bartley, Time for HOTU!sty in Taxation, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 2001, at 
A21 ("[A] complex tax code is political camouflage."). 
135. See, e.g., Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Simplicity of the Flat Tax: Is It Unique?, 
14 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 283 (1997) (describing the simplifying aspects of the 
HalllRabushka style of flat taxes and a brief summary of the other proposals and 
contrasting them with the limits of simplification under traditional income tax 
reform). 
136. See, e.g., Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Individual Tax Reform for Fairness and 
Simplicity: Let Economic Growth Fend for Itself, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 459 (1993) 
(proposing changes to the existing tax code that would simplify its application); Joseph 
A. Snoe, Tax Simplification and FairTU!ss: Four Proposals for Fundamental Tax 
Reform, 60 ALB. L. REV. 61 (1996) (detailing four specific reform programs within the 
context of the existing income tax that could have dramatic simplification gains for the 
system). 
137. For a humorous take on what that postcard-sized return might look like, see 
Bruce McCall, Flat Tax Return, THE NEW YORKER, April 8, 1996, at 110. 
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interest income would make tax enforcement more costly and would 
represent a gain for simplicity at a cost for efficiency. 
Finally, the transition from our present tax scheme to a new 
regime will not be simple. No matter how "simple" a new tax regime 
may appear in the abstract, we must keep in mind that it will be 
interpreted by fallible judges who sometimes get confused or add 
complexities of their own.13S Indeed, the now-maligned income tax 
code started out just fourteen pages long and its application was 
profoundly shaped by judicial decisions applying that "simple" 
statute to devilishly detailed practical situations.139 The concepts 
developed under the income tax code are likely to continue to guide 
judicial interpretations of any new tax plans because all of the reform 
proposals make extensive use of well-established tax terms rooted in 
the distinctions arising under present law.14D 
D. Stability 
A sudden, drastic change in the tax base and tax rates would 
wreak havoc in all areas of the economy, and especially in the state 
and local government sector.141 The tax code is currently a major 
consideration for all actors in the economy, be they investors deciding 
what to invest in, or local government finance officers deciding 
whether to borrow or tax to fund a particular project. Given that 
virtually all actors in the economy base their decisions at least partly 
on tax considerations, many people will be hurt economically if the 
tax treatment of their actions changes suddenly.142 
138. See generally Mary L. Heen, Plain Meaning, the Tax Code, and Doctrinal 
Incoherence, 48 HAsTINGS L.J. 771 (1997) (discussing the challenges of coherent and 
consistent judicial interpretation of statutory provisions using tax decisions involving 
the same statutory provision interpreted with three different techniques). 
139. See Pollack, supra note 132, at 322-330 (providing a concise history of the 
income tax code from its inception through World War n. 
140. See Lester B. Snyder and Marianne Gallegos, Redefining the Role of the 
Federal Income Tax: Taking the Tax Law "Private" Through the Flat Tax and Other 
Consumption Taxes, 13 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 1, 4-5 (1996) ("Much of what has been written 
to date on the proposed consumption tax legislation presumes Congress will be writing 
on a clean slate. However, many of the concepts referred to in the consumption tax 
bills borrow heavily from current income tax law.... By retaining these distinctions in 
the proposed reforms, we create a new generation of complexity ...."). 
141. See Christopher Farrell, A Flat Tax is Flat-Out Risky, Bus. WK., Feb. 19, 1996, 
at 80 ("The gains could be easily dwarfed by wrenching business and household 
upheavals as America shifts to a new tax code."). 
142. For example, the value of tax exempt obligations decreases based on changes in 
the tax law, affecting the net worth of the holders of those obligations. For a more 
complete discussion of transition dislocations, see generally Ronald A. Pearlman, 
Transition Issues in Moving to a Consumption Tax: A Tax Lawyer's Perspective, in 
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM, supra note 59, at 393, 406, 
discussing major transition problems such as the fairness to taxpayers nearing 
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There has been a spirited debate in academic circles concerning 
whether there is a need for transition rules to soften the blow to 
taxpayers who made plans under one tax regime only to have those 
plans significantly altered by subsequent tax law changes. In the 
view of some scholars, such transition rules are economically 
wasteful since they amount to insurance policies protecting vested 
taxpayers against the repeal of tax preferences.143 Because these 
insurance policies are funded by the public, the beneficiaries of the 
insurance have no incentive to respond to changing political and 
economic realities. Others have argued that forswearing transition 
rules will only make the situation worse by increasing political 
maneuvering and increasing the cost of tax preferences to the 
government to compensate beneficiaries for the lack of 
grandfathering protection.l44 It may be that the transition rules are 
irrelevant as a matter of economics or finance and that the real test 
for transitional relief is a political one.145 One thing is certain: if the 
current tax scheme is repealed, the groups that benefited from that 
system will "clamor for political relief."146 
Regardless of the outcome of the debate about what to do when 
the tax law changes, it nevertheless remains true that, all things 
being equal, stability ordinarily is a goal of tax policy. Although there 
have been many changes to the income tax code over the years, the 
changes have occurred within the context of a familiar system. 
retirement in switching to a consumption based tax system just as they are about to 
become consumers instead of wage earners and radically changing the plans made by 
taxpayers in reliance on the existing tax rules. But such a transition would not be 
beyond the ingenuity of policymakers. See Joseph Bankman, The Engler-Krwll 
Consumption Tax Proposal: What Transition Rule Does Fairness (or Politics) Require?, 
56 SMU L. REV. 83 (2003); Mitchell L. Engler & Michael S. Knoll, Simplifying the 
Transition to a (Progressive) Consumption Tax, 56 SMU L. REV. 53 (2003). 
143. See Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income 
Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47, 65 (1977); Louis Kaplow, An Ecorwmic Analysis of 
Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 511, 533-36 (1986). 
144. See generally Kyle D. Logue, Tax Transitions, Opportunistic Retroactivity, and 
the Benefits of Government Precommitment, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1129 (1996); J. Mark 
Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, Tax Transitions and the Protection Racket: A Reply to 
Professors Graetz and Kaplow, 75 VA. L. REV. 1155 (1989). But see HJALMAR BOEHM & 
MICHAEL FUNKE, OPTIMAL INVESTMENT STRATEGIES UNDER DEMAND AND TAX 
UNCERTAINTY (CESifo, Working Paper Series No. 311, 2000) (rmding that investment 
is not affected by the degree of tax policy uncertainty), available at 
http://ssrn.comlabstract=263519. 
145. See Eric Chason, The Economic Ambiguity (and Possible Irrelevance) of Tax 
Transition Rules, 22 VA. TAX REV. 615, 618 (2003) (setting forth the case that the 
choice of tax-transition rules is "generally irrelevant from an efficiency or revenue 
perspective"). 
146. See Julie Roin, The Consequences of Undoing the Federal Income Tax, 70 U. 
Cm. L. REV. 319, 321 (2003) (describing some of the political battles that may be 
anticipated if the income tax is repealed). 
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Wholesale reform of the entire taxation system has no modern 
precedent in the United States. It would be very difficult to predict 
the disruption that the transition would engender, but even 
supporters of flat tax plans admit there would be significant 
instability during the transition.147 Even after the transition, 
however, the new flat taxes would be subject to tinkering the same 
way income taxes currently are. It will be hard to realize any benefits 
from any plan if the taxation scheme is not left in place long enough 
for the changes brought about by the new regime to take root.l4S 
The current tax code already changes with fair regularity, and 
we should expect a new tax code to require some fine-tuning that will 
result in technical changes for a few years after enactment. Given the 
fundamental nature of the reforms being proposed, it is unlikely that 
policy makers will get all the details of the new tax regime right on 
the first try. Even without technical adjustments, it is merely the 
nature of our political process that Congress will be unable to resist 
the temptation to tinker with the tax code regardless of the tax 
base. 149 
Besides the importance of stable tax policy to investment 
planning, the tax system should act as a stabilizing influence on the 
economy during times of economic fluctuation. In the economy at 
large, the income tax structure is responsible for countering swings 
in the business cycle. In an upturn of the economy, caused by either 
real economic growth or inflation, the income tax automatically 
produces higher revenue yields without lag time or a governmental 
discretionary act, such as a reassessment of property, and collects 
less in a downturn number. In this way, the government extracts 
more money during times of prosperity and less in recessionary times 
to lessen the possibility of the economy swinging out of controI,1so A 
consumption tax is less likely to be as robust an automatic stabilizer 
because the revenue stream produced by the tax will be much "more 
stable over the business cycle.mS1 
147. See McLure, supra note 135, at 294 ("[Tlransition from the current income tax 
to the flat tax would inevitably be complicated."). 
148. See The Flat Tax: "Nutty" It's Not, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 1996, at A14 (Gary 
Becker opining that the long term benefits of a flat tax will not be achieved unless the 
tax structure is stable over time). 
149. See Nolan, supra note 8, at 219 (voicing the opinion that Congress will 
inevitably tinker with and experiment with the tax system to meet various economic, 
social, or other goals). 
150. See PECHMAN, supra note 19, at 9-20 (discussing the automatic stabilization 
effect of the income tax). 
151. See JAMES M. BICKLEY, FLAT TAX: AN OVERVIEW OF SELECTED POLICY ISSUES 
RELEVANT TO THE HALL-RABUSHKA PROPOSAL 15-16 (Cong. Research Serv., Working 
Paper No. 96-428E, 1996) (noting the expected role a flat tax would play in the 
stabilization function). 
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This attribute of cycle-countering causes the revenue yields of 
the income tax to be quite volatile. While it lends stability to the 
economy in general, the volatile yields of the progressive tax make 
fiscal planning in the public sector a more difficult task. The revenue 
yield from the HalllRabushka inspired reform proposals potentially 
will be much more reliable and will have the benefit of making fiscal 
planning easier/52 even ifits macroeconomic stabilizing effect is less. 
The preceding discussion shows that the tax reform proposals 
would fail to achieve the traditional goals of tax policy. If the 
negative impact on municipal finance that would result from 
adoption of the reform proposals is as obvious as it seems, then the 
proponents are either willfully blind to the problems their bills could 
create or they are in fact promoting these proposals for reasons other 
than the attainment of the traditional tax policy goals. An 
alternative explanation for promoting radical tax reform may be 
found in the political philosophy Of conservatism. 
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION FOR RADICAL TAX REFORM 
As the preceding discussion points out, enactment of any of the 
radical tax reform proposals will fail to achieve the policy goals of 
vertical equity, efficiency, or stability and will generate adverse 
consequences that will outweigh the modest gains to horizontal 
equity and simplicity that might result from their enactment. This 
policy failure seems fairly likely when examined in light of the 
traditional goals of tax policy, yet the sponsors of radical tax reform 
continue to promote their plans in the language of fairness, 
simplicity, efficiency, and stability. When the rhetoric of reform and 
the predictable consequences of the proposals do not add up, one 
must wonder if the proponents truly believe what they are saying or 
whether there is something else going on. If one looks at the political 
ideology of the proponents of radical tax reform, one sees that 
something else is going on. Flat tax proponents are really concerned 
about one of the most fundamental issues of our political system-the 
power of the central government!53 
The proponents of radical tax reform are politicians who would 
likely describe themselves as "conservative" even though they 
certainly are not all cut from the same cloth.154 The rise of 
conservatism has been a major force in American politics in the past 
152. See id. at 15. 
153. See Kornhauser, supra note 9, at 2348 (discussing the rhetoric of the tax 
reform debate: "Behind the economic arguments, however, lurk beliefs about the 
extent and nature of government, the right to property, and moral worth."). 
154. Representative Gephardt is the exception that proves the rule. He is certainly 
more "liberal" than the other would-be tax reformers. 
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twenty years, although exactly what conservatism is remains hard to 
define with precision. Given all of the internal contradictions and 
differences of opinion among political actors who refer to themselves 
or are classified by others as "conservative," it would probably be 
incorrect to refer to American conservatism as an "ideology.m55 
Nevertheless, there are several core beliefs in the conservative 
tradition, and, by urging the implementation of sweeping changes in 
federal tax law, conservative legislators are seeking to advance two 
important conservative goals: (1) elimination of the opportunity for 
the federal government to engage in what they consider to be 
illegitimate "social engineering" through the use of tax expenditures 
contained in the tax code; and (2) changing the way taxes are raised 
in order to make the total tax burden more visible to state and local 
taxpayers in hopes that the citizens will rebel against taxes generally 
and reduce the taxes over which they have the most control. The 
traditional tax policy goals discussed earlier in this Article are only 
window dressing for these real objectives.I56 
One might fairly respond, however, that the distinction between 
the putative goals of tax policy (i.e., efficiency, equity, simplicity, and 
stability) and the two real goals (reduction of social engineering and 
a devolution of taxes to the local level) may not be such an airtight 
distinction. One might maintain that the putative and the real goals 
are more intimately intertwined than suggested and indeed are 
means to one another, or are sub-species of one another. For 
155. Exactly what constitutes a conservative has been the subject of much debate. 
See SARA DIAMOND, ROADS TO DOMINION: RIGHT-WING MOVEMENTS AND POLITICAL 
POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 9-11 (1995) (identifying four broad movements that are 
often referred to as being part of the "Right": (1) the anticommunists, (2) the racist 
Right, (3) the Christian Right, and (4) the neoconservatives); CHARLES W. DUNN & J. 
DAVID WOODARD, THE CONSERVATIVE TRADITION IN AMERICA 28-42 (1996) (noting the 
lack of agreement on whether conservatism is an ideology and summarizing the views 
of five political philosophers who have attempted to characterize the different types of 
contemporary American conservatives). Often libertarians are lumped into the 
"conservative" category, although there is certainly much tension between true 
libertarians and other brands of conservatism such as, say, moraVreligious 
conservatives. For example, it is likely that libertarians would oppose "social 
engineering" as an illegitimate infringement of individual freedom in all situations, 
whereas moral conservatives might not mind social engineering if it promotes a set of 
behaviors in which they believe, while neoconservatives might merely be wary of it, 
one way or another. See generally E.J. DIONNE, JR., WHY AMERICANS HATE POLITICS 
(1991). 
156. Of course, it is not that unusual for politicians to be less than completely 
candid about what they hope their legislation will achieve. It is not uncommon for 
legislation to be justified in language that has wide acceptance because stating its true 
purpose in plain language would fail to attract the political support necessary for 
passage. See Eric J. Gouvin, Truth in Savings and the Failure of Legislative 
Methodology, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1281, 1327-34 (1994) (discussing the common lack of 
candor in the legislative process and providing examples). 
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example, a conservative could take the position that, while efficiency 
is a value maximized by non-interference with the market, what 
motivates defenders of efficiency is the belief that individuals should 
make their own choices, and the field of choices should be as 
expansive as possible. Taxes interfere with efficiency because they 
create obstacles to offering certain products and services that, in 
turn, reduce individual choice. It is a small step to argue that the 
general objection to social engineering is cut from the same cloth. 
What conservatives object to about social engineering is that the 
social and political landscape is being altered from above and in a 
way (1) that may not reflect the policy choices of the people, and (2) 
which, once implemented, narrows the range, or raises the costs, of 
available choices. In the end, the conservative argument could be 
summed up by saying that the policy imperative for tax efficiency 
and the conservative antipathy to federal social engineering are two 
different aspects of the conservative belief in the importance of 
individual choice. 
Such an argument makes sense in the abstract, but, as applied 
to the flat tax debate, it falls a bit short. While the four traditional 
goals of tax policy get their due in public discussions of radical tax 
reform, the opposition to "social engineering" or the promotion of 
devolution is not rolled into the discussion of "efficiency." The 
efficiency discussion focuses on economics and economic efficiency 
rather than on the political values of liberty and personal choice. The 
two "real" motivations developed in this Article, while they might be 
thought of as subsets of other aspects of conservative thought, are 
usually not discussed as such in the public debate and, in fact, are 
often omitted from or down played in the policy discussion. This 
section will examine the "real" goals in more detail. 
A. 	 Eliminating the Use of Tax Expenditures for "Social 

Engineering" 

Although conservatism is by no means a uniform ideology, there 
are some core foundation principles to which most conservatives 
subscribe, including the following: (1) conservatism is more of a world 
view than a political agenda; (2) conservatism does not embrace the 
notion of "the perfectibility of man" or the attainment of a social 
utopia and offers no prescriptive program to solve social problems; 
and (3) conservatives believe that change should proceed gradually 
and organically within the bounds of existing local institutions, such 
as communities, churches, universities, and organizations rather 
than through the agency of central government imposing 
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theoretically correct rules of socially desirable behavior.I57 
Conservatives harbor a deep suspicion of intellectual fashions. They 
are much more likely to perceive the time-tested societal traditions 
and customs as preferable to radical new ideas. This bias in favor of 
established institutions arises because, in the conservative world 
view, the intellectual capacity of anyone human being is relatively 
slight compared to the sum total of human experience over the 
ages. ISS Skepticism of human omniscience brings with it a skepticism 
of governmental omniscience because governments are composed of 
human beings and all human beings have a limited stock of reason 
and wisdom. Because they are skeptical of the capabilities of 
government to do a better job in directing human behavior than the 
organically evolved social norms and institutions handed down from 
history, conservatives oppose attempts by the central government to 
engage in "social planning."159 
That conservatives distrust government sponsored programs 
calculated by policy analysts to bring about socially beneficial change 
should not be interpreted to mean that conservatives are opposed to 
all change whatsoever. Change is inevitable and even necessary if a 
society is to survive and thrive. Conservatives, however, prefer to see 
that inevitable change proceed from experience and be as consistent 
as possible with tradition, continuity, and social order.I60 
Conservatives loath proposed changes to the social order, no matter 
how well-reasoned or well-intentioned, that spring from the abstract 
intellectual constructs of social planners rather than from the 
natural progression of human experience.I61 Indeed, there is a special 
epithet conservatives employ to describe government efforts to mold 
human behavior: "social engineering. "162 
157. RUSSELL KIRK, THE CONSERVATIVE MIND: FROM BURKE TO ELIOT 8-11 (7th rev. 
ed. 1986) (discussing the core tenets of conservatism). 
158. [d. at 36-37 (quoting Edmund Burke for the proposition that it is better to rely 
the "general bank of capital of nations and ages" than on the "private stock of reason" 
of an individual). 
159. The modern conservative's distrust of central planning owes a great deal to the 
work of Friedrich A. Hayek, who warned about the pernicious effects of government 
involvement in the economy. See generally FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO 
SERFDOM (1944) (articulating the view that central direction of economic activity 
according to a government plan ultimately brings dictatorship and the suppression of 
freedom). 
160. CLINTON ROSSITER, CONSERVATISM IN AMERICA 72-76 (1955) (expressing the 
idea that stability, continuity, and the restriction of change contribute to a good 
society). 
161. KIRK, supra note 157, at 9 (noting a profound distrust by conservatives of 
"'sophisters, calculators, and economists'" who think they can reinvent society 
according to their own designs). 
162. Use of the term "social engineering" has not been limited to conservatives, 
however. Liberals have co-opted the term to describe the conservatives' pro-family 
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Try as one might, it is difficult to find the term "social 
163engineering" used in anything but a pejorative sense. It is not, 
however, difficult to find it used in conjunction with discussions of 
federal tax policy.l64 It may not be going too far to suggest that 
conservatives see Adam Smith's invisible hand as being guided by 
the hand of God acting through the free will of His people.16s Indeed 
some people believe their religious convictions compel them to press 
for fundamental tax reform.166 When government attempts to pervert 
the free choices of those people by creating artificial incentives in the 
tax code that would not otherwise be present in the free market, 
conservatives take it almost as an affront to human dignity.167 
agenda. See, e.g., Walter Olson, Family Planning: Social Engineering Tempts the 
Right, REASON, Mar. 1998, at 56, at http://reason.com!9803/col.olson.shtml. 
163. See, e.g. Betty Freauf, How the Left Turned Some People Right, 
NEWSWITHVIEWS.COM, Apr. 12, 2003 (praising the "undying dedication of the 
conservatives who continue exposing the truth" in making "'sixties indoctrinated 
lefties' ... realize ... [that tlhey had become victims of diabolical social engineering"), 
at http://www.newswithviews.com/BettylFreauf20.htm;WesVernon.·Clinton-Era 
Social Engineering' Still Plagues the Military, NEwsMAx.COM, Oct. 28, 2003 
(criticizing the "double standards between men and women" in the military caused by 
"feminist-driven pressure"), at http://www.newsmax.com!archiveslarticlesl2003/10/27/ 
163539.shtml. 
164. See Paul Craig Roberts, A Groundswell is Building: Toss the Tax System, BuS. 
WK., May 5, 1997, at 26 ("The function of a tax system is to raise revenues, not to 
engineer society."); Sen. John Ashcroft, Tax Relieffor Those Most in Need, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 13, 1996, at A22 (referring to the Clinton administration as "social engineers" 
who "tinker with the American peoples' judgment"). 
165. For an explicit articulation of opposition to tax expenditures on the grounds 
they violate God's plan, see RONALD PASQUARIELLO, TAX JUSTICE: SOCIAL AND MORAL 
AsPECTS OF AMERICAN TAX POLICY 2, 5 (1985). In the chapter entitled "Christians and 
the Tax System," the author notes: "tal second reason for Christian concern about the 
tax system is this: Through the tax system, the government encourages certain types 
of economic and social behavior." [d. at 2. The author goes on to draw the following 
lesson from scripture: 
The lesson of Genesis is this: To be human, to be made in the image of the 
Creator, is to be endowed with the ability to give shape to the world, to have 
the ability to participate fully in one's society, to have one's voice heard, to 
make a difference .... If this is what we are to be, shapers of the economic 
and social reality of the world, and if indeed this is what the tax system does, 
then we must be involved with the tax system as a Christian duty.... 
Whatever distortions it contains of essentially Christian values, are the 
product of our intention or of our indifference. In either case, we have a 
responsibility[,l ... by virtue of the fact that we are responsible ... to assure 
that the tax system helps deliver ajust, sustainable and participatory world. 
[d. at 5. 
166. See Susan Pace Hamill, An Argument for Tax Reform Based on Judea­
Christian Ethics, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2002) (arguing for more vertical equity in 
Alabama's tax scheme based on Jesus' teachings about helping the disadvantaged). 
167. See JOSEPH J. JACOBS, THE COMPASSIONATE CONSERVATIVE: SEEKING 
RESPONSIBILITY AND HUMAN DIGNITY 199,209 (1996) {"The assumption that human 
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Although they obviously engender strong opposition on 
philosophical grounds, tax incentives have long been used as an 
instrument to induce socially desirable activities in the general 
economy or to provide tax subsidies or penalties to correct market 
failures. 16s Although the public typically refers to these tax incentives 
as "loopholes," tax policy analysts call them "tax expenditures.'H69 Tax 
expenditures have been defended on the grounds that they promote 
employment, economic growth, and equity, support worthwhile 
institutions, and assist state and local governments. 170 Proponents 
also insist that government intervention in the economy is justified 
when there is a perceived failure of the private market to allocate 
resources efficiently.l7l In addition, advocates urge, in some cases, 
there are advantages to providing subsidies through the income tax 
instead of providing an explicit subsidy through a government agency 
because the tax incentive can be administered through the tax 
system, which is already in place and which reaches virtually all of 
the American public. 
While tax expenditures can be defended on policy grounds, they 
always entail a trade-off of equity and/or efficiency in the tax system, 
and sometimes they do not achieve the goals they were designed to 
address. 172 There is a large literature criticizing tax expenditures for 
behavior, or more precisely human happiness and welfare, can be reduced to a 
mathematical or engineering construct denigrates the wonderful diversity of human 
beings.... There is ... a demonstrably superior judge to answer all these questions 
[about allocating resources): Free markets and free choice. There is also a by-product 
to free choice in a free market--dignity."}. 
168. For a thoughtful treatment of an appropriate role for tax expenditures, see 
Maureen B. Cavanaugh, On the Road to Incoherence: Congress, Economics, and Taxes, 
49 UCLA L. REV. 685 (2002). 
169. Tax expenditures are made through the federal individual income tax by way 
of the exclusion, exemption, or deferral of certain types of income from taxation, a 
preferential rate on certain types of income, or a deduction or tax credit for certain 
selected costs. See Nonna A. Noto, Tax Expenditures: The Link Between Economic 
Intent and the Distribution ofBenefits Among High, Middle, and Low Income Groups, 
in 5 STUDIES IN TAXATION, PuBLIC FINANCE AND RELATED SUBJECT&-A COMPENDIUM 
59, 60 (Fund for Public Policy Research ed., 1981) (noting the forms of tax 
expenditure). 
170. Murray L. Weidenbaum, The Case for Tax Loopholes, in A NEW TAX 
STRUCTURE FOR THE UNITED STATES 16, 25 (David H. Skadden ed. 1978) (noting these 
rationales for tax expenditures). 
171. See generally Jane G. Gravelle, Tax Policy and Spillover Effects: The Use of 
Tax Provisions to Induce Socially Desirable Activities, in 5 STUDIES IN TAXATION, 
PuBLIC FINANCE AND RELATED SUBJECT&-A COMPENDIUM 50 (Fund For Public Policy 
Research ed., 1981) (stating that examples of tax expenditures that address market 
failures or attempt to correct externalities have included pollution control and historic 
preservation). 
172. See Rochelle Sharpe, Great Expectations: A Tax Credit Designed to Spur Hiring 
Seems Promising-at First, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 1997, at Al (reporting on businesses' 
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a number of shortcomings. 173 In general, however, tax expenditures 
tend to raise problems with equity174 and efficiency.175 
Despite the economic and policy arguments that can and have 
been made against tax expenditures, when conservative politicians 
voice their support for tax reform, the case for eliminating tax 
expenditures boils down to the language of social engineering. A 
sampling of rhetoric from the Congressional Record bears this out: 
~ Rep. McCrery, Republican of Louisiana, speaking III 
favor of broad marginal rate tax cuts: 
[U]nlike the tax policy of the pnor [Clinton] 
administration, marginal rate cuts do not 
discriminate. They do not favor only individuals 
engaging in activities deemed worthy. They do not 
experience with a tax incentive designed to motivate the hiring of welfare recipients 
and finding that the red tape of qualifying for the incentive often outweighed the 
benefit provided). 
173. For the classic assault on tax expenditures, see Stanley S. Surrey, Tax 
Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct 
Government Expenditures, 83 HARv. L. REV. 705 (1970) (attacking tax expenditures on 
the grounds that they reward taxpayers for doing what they would have done anyway, 
benefit the wealthy, distort the market, and contribute to high tax rates by eroding the 
tax base); see also CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE: TAX 
EXPENDITURES AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1997) (arguing that tax 
expenditures have created a "hidden" welfare state that is more difficult to monitor 
and control than the one that is administered through direct government programs); 
MARK KELMAN, STRATEGY OR PRINCIPLE?: THE CHOICE BETWEEN REGULATION AND 
TAXATION (1999) (raising concerns about political accountability when the tax system 
is used to regulate behavior instead of the more transparent method of raising money 
and promulgating legislation). 
174. With regard to equity, it is sometimes said that tax expenditures benefit the 
wealthy at the expense of the poor. Empirical evidence fails to support that idea, 
however. See Noto, supra note 169, at 61-64. A study examined tax expenditures for 
the fiscal year 1978 in four broad categories: investment, consumption, employment, 
and need. Id. at 61. The investments tax expenditure category included items such as 
the investment tax credit, depreciation, depletion allowances, capital gains benefits, 
and the exclusion of municipal bonds. Id. at 61-62. The consumption category included 
deductibility of state-local taxes, charitable contributions, medical expenses, and 
mortgage interest. Id. at 62. The employment tax expenditure included all untaxed 
fringe benefits, and the need category encompassed the exclusions of various types of 
transfer payments and pension allowances. Id. at 62-63. The study found that the 
benefits were distributed regressively (i.e., the poor got more) in the need category, 
and progressively in the investment category, but that the consumption and 
employment categories showed no unified trend. Id. at 61-64. 
175. On the efficiency front, some analysts insist that tax expenditures are less 
efficient than an up-front direct subsidy. Burstein, supra note 100, at 72. The 
exemption for the interest of municipal bonds from taxation is often cited as an 
inefficient means of subsidizing state and local borrowing. See id. Reformers suggest 
that the government should make direct subsidy payments to municipalities. See id. 
(noting the potential cost savings to the federal government by using a direct subsidy 
for municipal bonds instead ofthe current scheme of exclusion from taxation). 
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use IRS agents as social engineers. Under these 
marginal rate cuts, if one pays income taxes, one 
gets a tax cut. It is that simple.176 
~ 	 Sen. Mack, Republican of Florida, speaking in favor of 
reducing the so-called marriage penalty: "It has of late 
become common practice to use the Tax Code for 
purposes of social engineering, discouraging some actions 
with the stick of tax penalties and encouraging others 
with the carrot of tax preferences."i77 
);> 	 Sen. Roberts, Republican of Kansas, speaking against 
either the income limitations on the $500 per child tax 
credit contained in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 or 
against the credit itself: "That is more social engineering 
than tax policy."i7S 
~ 	 Then Rep. (now Sen.) Brownback, Republican of Kansas, 
speaking on the matter of taxes: "It is time we cut back 
on manipulation out of Washington and say that the Tax 
Code is not for social engineering; it is not for economic 
engineering. The Tax Code is for raising revenue for the 
federal government."i79 
~ 	 Sen. Abraham, Republican of Michigan, speaking on the 
conservative revolution of the 1994 election: "They saw 
the dangers big-government social engineering posed to 
our economy and brought about the most significant 
political revolution in this country in 50 years, putting 
the free-market Republican party in control of both 
houses of Congress.mso 
~ 	 Rep. Cook, Republican from Utah, speaking on the topic 
"Our Country Needs Sweeping Tax Reform": 
Congress has used the American Tax Code as a 
tool for social engineering, and that is not right. 
Behaviors are rewarded or punished through a 
little tinkering here and a little tinkering there of 
the Tax Code. I believe that is a cynical and 
improper use of our power. Americans pay taxes 
to support a government created to serve them, 
not to a government created to control them.lsl 
176. 147 CONGo REC. H2214 (daily ed. May 16, 2001). 
177. 146 CONGo REC. 86825 (daily ed. July 14, 2000). 
178. 143 CONGo REC. 88455 (daily ed. July 31,1997). 
179. 142 CONGo REC. H3457 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1996). 
180. 144 CONGo REC. 87699 (daily ed. July 8, 1998). 
181. 143 CONGo REC. H783 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1997). 
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~ 	 Sen. Craig, Republican of Idaho, speaking on the 
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act 
of 1998: 
The tax laws of our country should not be used for 
social engineering, nor should they be designed in 
such a way to tempt and enable legislators and 
bureaucrats to manipulate social policy in this 
country, to decide for the taxpayers what is good 
for them, and to use the tax code and the IRS to 
force them to behave accordingly. That impulse 
for social engineering, directed from a 
Washington, DC, that thought it was all-knowing, 
is what grew the tax code and gave the IRS its 
power. Decades of tax-and-spend Congress 
empowered and encouraged the tax collector to 
step outside the due process Americans expect in 
every other encounter with their government, and 
went about structuring social policy through tax 
law; and they gained power and they gained 
control.182 
~ 	 Sen. Craig, Republican of Idaho, speaking on Tax Reform 
generally: "The Internal Revenue Code is too complex, 
produces arbitrary results, and is far too involved in 
social engineering.m83 
~ 	 Senator Grams, Republican from Minnesota, speaking on 
the Treasury and General Government Appropriation 
Act, 1999: 
The tax code must be terminated because it has 
long been used as a tool for social engineering and 
income redistribution rather than sound economic 
policy. . .. Clearly, a system of graduated 
marginal rates violates the principle of fairness. 
In addition, special interest groups are often 
unfairly rewarded by politicians with special tax 
privileges.1B4 
~ 	 Sen. Shelby of Alabama, speaking on the introduction of 
the Freedom and Fairness Restoration Act of 1997: "The 
current Tax Code is the product of a 40-year experiment 
with social engineering that has hampered the effort of 
the American people to be free, bear the fruit of their 
labor and ultimately live the American dream. m85 
182. 144 CONGo REC. S7663 (daily ed. July 8, 1998). 
183. 143 CONGo REC. S3196 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 1997). 
184. 144 CONGo REC. S9120 (daily ed. July 28, 1998). 
185. 143 CONGo REC. S7770 (daily ed. July 21, 1997). 
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~ 	 Rep. Dick Armey of Texas, on taxation generally: "as a 
result of decades of social engineering, the United States 
Tax Code has evolved into a complex maze of deductions, 
credits, exemptions, and special preferences under which 
taxpayers with same incomes can pay vastly different 
amounts in taxes;"186 and in support of the Flat Tax: 
"[after the enactment of a flat tax] [n]o longer will the 
special interests be able to work their political mischief. 
Nor will the social engineers be able to conduct their 
experiments in the tax code."187 
~ 	 Rep. Chabot, Republican of Ohio: "To their [liberal 
Democrats'] way of thinking, only if the government 
decides whether they are worthy of some social 
engineering should they get a tax cut.m88 
~ 	 Rep. Schaffer, Republican of Colorado: "Of course, April 
15 is not a day liberals find too offensive. April 15 is a 
high holy day for all the social engineers, the central 
planners, and the big government liberals who worship 
at the altar ofbureaucracy."189 
These are not traditional economic arguments about the 
efficiency of tax expenditures. These arguments do not even pick up 
the standard rhetoric of tax policy. These are instead political 
arguinents about the acceptable extent of government power. They 
are informed by the writings of Nobel-prize winning economist 
Freidrich Hayek, whose distrust of government power ran deep.19o 
These arguments made against social engineering and the evil of 
tax expenditures are no doubt made in sincerity by public-minded 
citizens and grounded on deeply-held philosophical beliefs. Yet the 
proponents of these massive changes seemingly fail to appreciate the 
irony of their position-they want to throw out one set of socially 
engineered incentives and replace them with a different set. All of 
186. 146 CONGo REC. H8746 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 2000). 
187. Armey, supra note 104, at 97. 
188. 145 CONGo REC. H6431 (daily ed. July 27,1999). 
189. 145 CONGo REC. H2061 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 1999). 
190. See DICK ARMEY, THE FLAT TAX: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE FACTS ON WHAT IT 
WILL DO FOR YOU, YOUR COUNTRY, AND YOUR POCKETBOOK 38 (1996). Rep. Armey 
criticizes the incentives that the current income tax creates for special interest groups 
to seek special treatment. [d. He slightly misquotes Hayek as saying, '''[als the 
coercive power of the state will alone decide who is to have what, the only power worth 
having will be a share in the exercise of the power [sic].'" [d. (misquoting HAYEK, supra 
note 159, at 107, who stated that the power worth having was "a share in the exercise 
of this directing power"). While Rep. Armey and other self-identified conservatives are 
fond of invoking Hayek's words, Hayek himself eschewed the "conservative" label and 
instead identified himself as a libertarian. See F.A. HAYEK, Postscript: Why [ Am Not A 
Conservative, in THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 397-411 (1960). 
454 RUTGERS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:2 
the tax reform proposals have a social engineering component-they 
are all designed to discourage consumption and encourage savings 
and investment.191 Indeed, the reform plans do not eliminate tax 
incentives; they merely replace the existing incentives with a new 
set. 192 If this is really what the process is about, the proponents 
should be more candid about it. 
Of course, since the days of the legal realists, jurisprudence has 
been skeptical of the idea that any legal scheme can be truly 
"neutral." In its strong form, the argument against the existence of 
neutrality holds that because laws will always have distributive 
effects on private decisions, the law can never achieve neutrality. As 
it relates to the tax reform debate, however, a conservative could 
assert that the neutrality argument is overstated. While any 
intellectually honest proponent of radical tax reform would have to 
concede that changing the tax system could result in the substitution 
of one set of socially engineered incentives for another, that 
proponent might nevertheless argue that there are degrees of non­
neutrality. Whereas the current tax scheme specifically favors some 
sectors of the economy and disfavors others, the reform proposals 
merely establish rules that generally discourage consumption and 
generally favor savings and investment. An intellectually honest 
opponent of radical tax reform would have to concede the point that, 
while this may be "social engineering," it does not have quite the 
same heavy-handed government involvement as programs that 
target particular preferences and activities and not others. While 
these two hypothetical, intellectually honest debaters might view the 
social engineering point this way, in the actual public policy debate 
proponents of radical tax reform rally around the elimination of 
social engineering and do not own up to the reality that they are not 
actually eliminating social engineering but merely substituting a 
perhaps less offensive variety of social engineering. 
191. See THE NAT'L COMM'N ON ECON. GROWTH AND TAX REFORM, UNLEASIDNG 
AMERICA'S POTENTIAL: A PRO-GROWTH, PRO-FAMILY TAX SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY 3-6 (1996), reprinted in The Kemp Comm'n Recommendations: A Small 
Business Perspective: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Small Business, 104th Congo 
90-93 (1996). This official report of the National Commission on Economic Growth and 
Tax Reform, sometimes called the "Kemp Commission" after its chairman, former 
Congressman Jack Kemp, snidely refers to the mess made by "special interest[s]," id. 
at 3, but then makes no bones about pushing a plan that, in their judgment, is 
calculated to promote "families" and "growth," id. at 6,-both terms that mean 
different things to different people and that smack of social engineering. 
192. Eisner, supra note 59, at 44 ("[TJhe flat tax substitutes serious new distortions 
for those it would eliminate."). 
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B. Realignment of Tax Federalism 
The other major conservative value advanced by radical tax 
reform is further devolution of government functions, including tax 
functions, away from Washington.193 The conservative-led process of 
shifting responsibilities for social programs from the federal 
government to the states has been underway in earnest at least since 
the Reagan administration.194 The proposed tax reforms fit nicely 
with an overall strategy that seeks to combine several dearly held 
tenets of conservatism relating to federalism (read: antipathy toward 
Washington) and the appropriate size of government (read: small).195 
First, conservatives prefer that political power be diffused and 
decentralized.196 Second, as a general matter they would prefer 
193. See Michael J. Boskin, A Framework for the Tax Reform Debate, in FRONTIERS 
OF TAX REFORM, supra note 25, at 10, 13 ("Tax reforms can affect the federal system in 
many ways, and we should favor those that strengthen it and devolve authority to 
state and local government and private institutions to the extent possible."); see also 
Armey, supra note 104, at 100 ("We flat taxers are populists. We flat-taxers think the 
vast resources of this great commercial nation can be better allocated over kitchen 
tables than over Capitol Hill's green felt tables."). This push to devolve the functions of 
government is fueled in part by conservative fears that the federal government is out 
of touch with the average American. For an expression of this sentiment in the tax 
area, see PAYNE, supra note 132, at 163-77 (describing the "culture oftaxing" in which 
the federal government imposes taxes while being basically oblivious to the taxpayer, 
the government does not prepare tax burden studies, the experts who testifY before 
Congress are predominantly IRS officials, past and present, the tax attorneys and 
accountants have captured the process, and taxpayers do not get actively involved 
because of the complexity and other constraints on their action). For an intriguing 
proposal about how to devolve the collection of taxes down to the local level, see Lior 
Jacob Strahilevitz, The Uneasy Case for Devolution of the Individual Income Tax, 85 
IOWA L. REV. 907 (2000) (arguing for a community approach). 
194. See ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, DEVOLVING 
FEDERAL PROGRAM RESPONSIBILITIES AND REVENUE SOURCES TO STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS (1985) (examining the challenges of state and local governments taking 
over programs previously administered by the federal government, including the 
challenge of how to finance the programs). 
195. These views may be held by people who do not consider themselves 
"conservatives" as well. See John Kincaid & Richard L. Cole, Changing Public 
Attitudes on Power and Taxation in the American Federal System, 31 PuBLIUS 205 
(2001). 
The federal government is viewed as providing citizens the least for their 
money; the federal income tax, followed the by local property tax, is seen as 
the worst tax; a majority of the public indicates that local governments need 
more power; the public is most likely to identifY the federal government as 
having too much power; and the public is least likely to say that the federal 
government needs more power. 
Id. at 205. 
196. See CLINTON ROSSITER, CONSERVATISM IN AMERICA, 64-66 (2d ed. 1962) (noting 
that a core belief of conservatives is the desirability of diffusing and balancing social, 
economic, cultural and political power); DUNN AND WOODARD, supra note 155, at 7 
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government to be as small as possible. 197 Third, as discussed above, 
they generally oppose government social programs that engage in 
social engineering.198 The primary thrust of the conservative agenda 
at the national level to address these three points has focused on 
devolution of federal programs to the states through mechanisms like 
the block grant, tax-reduction (funded by cuts to programs they do 
not support), and structural changes designed to make the imposition 
of new taxes more difficult, on the theory that government growth is 
fueled by the availability of tax revenues.199 But conservatives are 
beginning to realize that the total burden of government is growing 
fastest at the state and local level,20o prompting them to turn their 
attention to that theater of operations.201 
Viewing "government" in all its manifestations-federal, state 
and local-as one giant "Leviathan" whose sole motive is to maximize 
its revenues, the conservative tax reform proposals aim to cut the 
monster down to size.202 The reform proposals do this, as noted above, 
("Shared traditional values held conservatism together during the turbulent postwar 
era. These values emphasized local control, a sense of morality, and respect for 
tradition'. "). 
197. See Armey, supra note 104, at 100 ("We believe government should be open, 
honest, direct-and smaller."). 
198. See supra notes 160-67 and accompanying text. 
199. See Gary S. Becker, Yes, Pass a Flat Tax-But Clamp a Lid on Spending, Bus. 
WK., July 1, 1996, at 20 (drawing the connection between tax revenue and government 
size). 
200. In the recent economic downturn, many states have had to increase taxes even 
as the federal government was cutting taxes. See Russell Gold, States' Tax Increases 
Are Creating a Drag on the Overall Economy, WALL ST. J., June 3, 2002, at A2; Russell 
Gold, States Are Seen Raising Taxes, Fees in Fiscal '03, WALL ST. J., May 16, 2002, at 
A2; Tom Herman, States May Need to Raise Taxes As Declines in Revenue Persist, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 12,2002, at D2. 
201. See Howard Gleckman, Why Income Tax Cuts Won't Lessen the Tax Bite, BuS. 
WK., Sept. 30, 1996, at 146 (noting that the overall tax burden in the past thirty years 
has increased primarily because of increases in payroll taxes and state and local 
taxes); see also Gary S. Becker, The States Should Find Their Own Way Out of This 
Hole, Bus. WK., May 26, 2003, at 30 (opining that states have "expanded spending to 
unsustainable levels"). 
202. The idea that all levels of government should be lumped together and treated 
as "Leviathan" is certainly controversial, but one that appeals to the conservative 
view. See GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX: 
ANALYTICAL FOUNDATIONS OF A FISCAL CONSTITUTION 28-30 (1980) (using the 
terminology of government as "Leviathan" and "Leviathan as monolith"). Concerns 
about the Leviathan's rapacious appetite may be a bit overblown if one considers the 
fact that the Leviathan has an encompassing interest in the productivity of the 
economy that it is feeding off of, and so has a great incentive to moderate its own take 
of the booty (that is, the Leviathan does not want to kill the goose that lays the golden 
egg). This idea was recently developed by Mancur Olson. See MANCUR OLSON, POWER 
AND PROSPERITY: OUTGROWING COMMUNIST AND CAPITALIST DICTATORSHIPS 14-23 
(2000). Others have reached similar conclusions about the Leviathan's behavior that 
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by making the tax burden more visible and fomenting popular 
opposition to taxes generally.203 This is easiest to see in the context of 
a federal retail sales tax or VAT. If those proposals are enacted, 
states will likely lose the ability to levy income taxes and will rely 
even more on their own sales taxes or property taxes. But the 
combined burden from a state and federal sales tax on every 
economic transaction is bound to cause taxpayers to experience 
"sticker shock." 
The results of such a tax sticker shock are widely anticipated 
and are, probably, intended consequences of the proposed reforms. 
Tax commentators have identified several likely results from the 
increase in state and local tax prices: (a) taxpayer pressure for 
reduction of state and local taxes and spending; (b) taxpayer 
opposition to future tax increases; (c) taxpayer hostility to 
redistributive tax and spending schemes; and (d) political pressure to 
shift the state and local tax burden away from households and 
toward businesses (on the assumption that under the typical 
consumption tax proposal businesses may continue to deduct state 
and local taxes as ordinary business expenses).204 While the VAT or 
sales tax example is easiest to see, all of the proposals will have the 
effect of making the costs of local government more visible by 
eliminating deductibility of state and local taxes and increasing the 
costs of bond financing. Frustrated citizens are likely to lash out in 
the place they have the loudest voice-town hall and the state 
house.205 
To the extent that tax reform proposals fuel the dynamic of 
making the total tax burden more visible and creating a mechanism 
for local tax reduction, they move toward the three conservative goals 
mentioned above. First, such a dynamic satisfies the conservative 
preference that government decisions be made locally, where smaller 
have been used to justify the progressive income tax-likening high marginal rates to 
a governmental equity stake in enterprises that creates an incentive for the Leviathan 
to establish conditions that will lead to taxpayers reaching the highest taxable rate 
levels. E.g., Francis Buckley & Eric Rasmusen, The Uneasy Case for the Flat Tax (July 
13, 1999), Washington Univ., Public Economics Working Paper No. 9907003, at 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwppe/9907003.html. 
203. See Blackwell, supra note 24, at 276-77 (advocating that taxes be as visible as 
possible to remind taxpayers what the true cost of government is). 
204. Mazerov supra note 50, at 1465-66 (listing the anticipated effects of tax law 
changes on state and local taxpayer attitudes). 
205. This dynamic is what produced the property tax revolts of the late 1970s and 
1980s--citizens encountered visible and heavy taxes and they did something about it. 
See Becker, supra note 199, at 20 ("The argument that resistance to higher taxes is 
greater when the burden is heavier and more transparent is supported by the fact that 
property owners led the tax rebellion in many states."). 
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206governmental units are more responsive to individual concerns.
Local political action for tax relief is the most likely course because 
individuals can have a bigger impact locally where individual votes 
are less diluted and therefore count relatively more than in national 
elections.207 
Second, if all local governments find themselves in the same 
boat, they will compete with each other to find the right level of taxes 
and government benefits.20B Although the federal deductibility of 
state and local taxes has traditionally been justified as a way to 
prevent sub-federal jurisdictions from competing with each other for 
tax base,209 the elimination of that provision and the other impacts 
discussed above will promote inter-jurisdictional competition. 
Inevitably, conservatives believe this will require reductions in taxes 
and government services, thereby achieving the second goal of 
reducing the size of government.210 In any event, if they fmd 
themselves in fiscal distress, state and local governments will be 
forced to cut programs, and, typically, in times of financial crisis, 
such cuts come to public assistance and social services.21l In some 
ways, this aspect of the tax reform impact is essentially an attempt 
206. See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. 
Cm. L. REV. 1484, 1493-94 (1987) (noting the responsiveness idea). 
207. See generally Gerald E. Frug, Empowering Cities in a Feckral System, 19 
URBAN LAw. 553 (1987) (noting that, in addition, local group identity fosters the 
building of consensus and promotes community involvement). 
208. See BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note 202, at 13-26 (advancing the argument 
that competition among decentralized units of government can break the monopolistic 
hold of a strong central government). But see William E. Oates, Feckralism and 
Government Finance, in MODERN PuBLIC FINANCE 126, 148 (John M. Quigley & 
Eugene Smolensky eds., 1994) (noting the lack of unambiguous empirical evidence to 
support the proposition that decentralization in and of itself constrains the overall size 
of government). 
209. See Briffault, supra note 68, at 545 (noting the anti-competitive effect of 
deductibility). 
210. 	 See Eisner, supra note 59, at 74. 

[The flat tax] tilts the playing field against state and local investment and 

other expenditures. . . . If we can assume that public choice has already 

given us an optimum amount of state and local services and taxes-which 

some may of course question-imposing an additional tax, which will cause 

total taxes to exceed the value of the services they are presumed to finance, 

can only discourage the provision of such services. 

[d. 
211. See Dick Netzer, The Effect of Tax Simplification on State and Local 
Governments, in ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAX SIMPLIFICATION 222, 234 (Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston, 1985) (noting that state and local fiscal crises tend to result in 
sharp cuts to social programs). 
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to realize the theoretical predictions of Charles Tiebout's famous 
model oflocal expenditures.212 
In Tiebout's view, localizing government decisions about how 
many government services to provide and how much to charge for 
them would permit the development of a market-style mechanism for 
satisfying citizen preferences for the appropriate level of government 
involvement.213 Those who do not like the total package of services 
and taxes in one town can vote with their feet and move to a town 
that is more suited to their preferences. While the Tiebout model has 
been a useful idea, it has obvious shortcomings as a descriptive 
matter.214 
Critics point out that the model fails because the exit option is 
not costless, and, in fact, may be quite costly, and because local 
taxpayers often lack the information necessary to make the 
appropriate decisions.215 In addition, observed reality indicates that 
localities supply public goods and services less as a function of local 
preferences than as a function oflocal wealth.216 
Despite its shortcomings, the model holds great appeal and may, 
in fact, inform a significant group of policy makers. It continues to 
have explanatory power for some observed dynamics. For example, a 
variation of the Tiebout idea justifies the observed competition 
among states to improve legal regimes.217 In the tax arena, however, 
212. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 
416, 416 (1956) (presenting a model, "which yields a solution for the level of 
expenditures for local public goods which reflects the preferences of the population 
more adequately than they can be reflected at the national level"). 
213. [d. at 424. 
214. See STEPHEN G. UTZ, TAX POLICY: AN INTRODUCTION AND SURVEY OF THE 
PRINCIPAL DEBATES 215-26 (1993) (discussing the problem of tax federalism with 
special attention to the Tiebout model and its shortcomings). But see THE VOLUNTARY 
CITY: CHOICE, COMMUNITY, AND CML SOCIETY (David T. Beito et al. eds., 2002) 
(providing a series of essays tending to show that a market-based model for delivering 
the package of municipal services, traditionally thought of as being the province of city 
governments, may be an effective tool for revitalizing urban areas). 
215. See DANIEL SHAVIRO, FEDERALISM IN TAXATION: THE CASE FOR GREATER 
UNIFORMITY 81-86 (1993) (criticizing the Tiebout model on grounds of exit costs and 
information problems). 
216. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II: Localism & Legal Theory, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 346, 422-25 (1990) (noting that differences in jurisdictions' spending 
patterns result from differences in fiscal capacity). 
217. See Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the 
Economic Theory ofRegulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation ofFederalism, 76 
VA. L. REV. 265, 291 (1990) (observing that the federal system has historically been 
seen as "a device for achieving a more efficient legal system by encouraging 
competition among the states"). 
460 RUTGERS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:2 
many observers worry that interstate tax competition has done more 
harm than good.218 
Finally, to the extent elimination of social engineering is part of 
the conservative agenda, moving the focus of taxation to the local 
level advances that goal as well. Tax analysts have understood for a 
long time that not all levels of government are equally good at all 
types of program finance. 219 Shifting the tax burden to state and local 
governments will make financing social programs especially difficult. 
Of course, from the conservative perspective, one of the most 
nefarious social engineering schemes is the redistribution of income 
from the wealthy to the poor.220 By imposing a regressive federal level 
tax and precluding state and local options for administering an 
income tax, the new tax regime could effectively eliminate 
redistribution plans, as local taxation schemes are ill-suited to carry 
out redistributive efforts.221 To the extent these plans will encourage 
a popular movement to reduce the tax burden overall or are coupled 
with tax rebates, that development will also indirectly help the 
crusade against social engineering.222 
218. FINANCING STATE GOVERNMENT IN THE 1990S, supra note 61, at 29-31 (1993) 
(noting that "interstate tax competition for economic development can undermine state 
tax bases, produce tax inequities, and inhibit tax policy reforms-at times without 
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219. See Richard A. Musgrave, Who Should Tax, Where, and What?, in TAX 
AsSIGNMENT IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES 2, 2-17 (Charles E. McLure, Jr. ed., 1983) 
(discussing the issue of which level of government is best suited to which kind of 
program finance). 
220. For the classic attack on progressivity and the dangers of redistribution 
through the income tax scheme, see BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 85, at 70-90 (arguing 
against progressivity on moral, economic and social grounds). 
221. See Paul E. Peterson, Who Should Do What? Divided Responsibility in the 
Federal System, BROOKINGS REV., Spring 1995, at 6, 9 ("Any locality making a serious 
attempt to tax the rich and give to the poor will attract more poor citizens and drive 
away the rich. No amount of determination on the part of local political leaders can 
make redistributive efforts succeed."). 
222. Rep. Weldon of Florida puts the link between reduced tax revenues and 
reduction in social engineering into a concise package: "The less revenue the 
Government takes in, the less social engineering, the less redistribution of wealth and 
the fewer new Government programs the left can oversee. That is why they hate tax 
relief so much." 145 CONGo REC. H8475 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1999). Some have suggested 
that the Republicans intentionally reduce tax revenue and run deficits in order to force 
the next (presumably Democratic) administration to face the difficult choices for 
bringing the budget back into balance. This certainly was borne out in the transition 
from the Reagan administration through the first Bush administration and into the 
Clinton administration. See Sheldon D. Pollack, Republican Antitax Policy, 91 TAX 
NOTES 289, 292-93 (2001). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Radical federal tax reform will have a radical effect on state and 
local governments. It will curtail revenue raising options, increase 
the costs of borrowing, and increase the tax price of state and local 
government services. The traditional goals of tax policy will not be 
well-served by the wrenching dislocations caused by these radical 
plans, but the underlying conservative agenda nevertheless supports 
changes in the tax system. The unstated (or at least understated) 
reasons for conservative support of federal tax law reform is the 
desire to bring about two major changes in government power: (1) to 
remove the tax expenditure device from the federal government as a 
tool of social engineering; and (2) to push more tax decisions to the 
state and local level to promote competition between jurisdictions in 
the hope that a dynamic will develop that shrinks the size of 
government and cuts social programs. 
On close examination, these goals are simplistic and even self­
contradictory. With regard to the "elimination" of social engineering, 
the reform proposals amount to nothing more than the desire to 
223 Onreplace one set of government incentives with a different set.
the point of re-balancing fiscal federalism, the push toward local 
power places too much faith in a Tiebout-like world view.224 In any 
event, if the real reasons for tax reform include the ideas developed 
in this Article, it would be desirable in the name of candor for 
proponents to put aside the window-dressing language of traditional 
tax policy analysis and instead talk about what they really want. 
Radical tax reformers have made little progress in enacting their 
schemes in part because they have failed to galvanize the American 
people in a principled, policy-oriented way.225 If the American citizens 
want to buy into one of these programs, as honestly stated, it should 
be enacted, but if they do not agree with the underlying philosophy of 
the promoters of these radical proposals, the proposals should be set 
aside and more traditional approaches to tax reform should take 
center stage. 
223. See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text. 
224. See supra notes 212-18 and accompanying text. 
225. Edward J. McCaffery, The Missing Links in Tax Reform, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 233, 
235, 251-52 (1999) (discussing the political shortcomings of the proponents of radical 
tax reform). 
